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A GUARDIAN AND A FRIEND?
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S PARTICIPATION 
IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
Fernando Dias Simões1
The figure of amicus curiae is a central feature of contemporary 
investor-state arbitration law and practice. Over the last several years 
the European Commission has taken part in a number of arbitral 
proceedings that touched upon matters of European Union Law. This 
phenomenon is part of the European Union’s broader incursion into the 
realm of investment law. The participation of an entity with legislative 
and political functions in investment arbitrations raises complex 
questions regarding the nature of the interests that this entity pursues 
and the potential impact that its involvement might have in the dispute 
settlement mechanism. This paper examines the participation of the 
European Commission (EC) in investor-state arbitrations and assesses 
its impact in the overall mechanism of investor-state dispute resolution. 
It is argued that the EC is fundamentally a distinct type of amicus, as it 
pursues interests different from those of traditional amici, and should 
therefore be accorded extended participatory rights. 
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifteen years amicus curiae briefs have become 
engrained in the law and practice of investor-state arbitration. The term 
‘amicus curiae’ – which literally translates as “friend of the court” – 
refers to “someone who is not a party to a law suit but who petitions the 
court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action because that 
person has a strong interest in the subject matter.”2 Normally amici
curiae are individuals or organizations that do not have the right to 
participate in the dispute as parties, but want to intervene because the 
outcome of the proceedings may affect their interests.3 Originally arbitral 
rules and international investment treaties contained no express 
 2. Amicus Curiae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Principle 13 
(titled “Amicus Curiae Submission”) of the American Law Institute & International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)’s Principles of Transnational 
Civil Procedure provides: “Written submissions concerning important legal issues in the 
proceeding and matters of background information may be received from third persons 
with the consent of the court, upon consultation with the parties. The court may invite 
such a submission. The parties must have the opportunity to submit written comment 
addressed to the matters contained in such a submission before it is considered by the 
court.” ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, UNIDROIT, 
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/transnational-civil-procedure (last updated Sept. 27, 
2016). See also Philippe J. Sands & Ruth Mackenzie, International Courts and Tribunals, 
Amicus Curiae, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 519 
(Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2011); Luigi Crema, Testing Amici Curiae in International Law: 
Rules and Practice, in 2012 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 91, 94 (Benedetto Conforti, et al., 
eds.); Steven Kochevar, Comment, Amici Curiae in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 122 YALE 
L.J. 1653, 1654–55 (2013). 
 3. Lance Bartholomeusz, The Amicus Curiae Before International Courts and 
Tribunals, 5 NON-ST. ACTORS & INT’L LAW 209, 273 (2005). 
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provisions concerning the participation of non-parties, neither prohibiting 
nor allowing it. The intervention of non-disputing parties in investment 
proceedings was accepted in a few groundbreaking cases and 
subsequently expressly enshrined in both arbitral rules and international 
investment agreements.4
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a free trade 
agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States of America, 
entered into force in 1994,5 led the way in the movement toward the 
acceptance of third parties in investor-state arbitration.6 While 
recognizing the right of NAFTA Member States to submit questions of 
interpretation of the agreement to a tribunal,7 the NAFTA did not contain 
any specific provision on submissions by third parties. This question 
arose in two cases conducted under the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules of 19768 – 
Methanex Corp. v. United States9 and United Parcel Service of America 
4. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from 
Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae”, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 15, 2001), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0517_0.pdf [hereinafter 
Methanex Corp. v. USA]; United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Canada, Decision of 
the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, (NAFTA 
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Oct. 17 2001), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0883.pdf. 
 5. North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTANOW.ORG,
http://www.naftanow.org (last visited March 29, 2017). 
 6. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes – 
Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (2006); 
Joachim Delaney & Daniel B. Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 721, 750 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 
2008; Sergio Puig & Meg Kinnear, NAFTA Chapter Eleven at Fifteen: Contributions to a 
Systemic Approach in Investment Arbitration, 25 ICSID REV.- FOREIGN INV. L.J. 225, 
259 (2010). 
 7. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1128, Dec. 8, 1993, 
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org [hereinafter NAFTA]. “On written notice to the 
disputing parties, a Party may make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of 
interpretation of this Agreement.” Id.
 8. G.A. Res. 31/98, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Dec. 15, 1976), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf. 
 9. Methanex Corp. v. USA, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third 
Persons to Intervene as “Amicus Curiae,” (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.). 
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Inc. v. Canada.10 Even though the NAFTA and the UNCITRAL Rules 
were silent on the issue, both arbitral tribunals decided to accept amicus 
curiae submissions.11 In reaction to these path-breaking decisions, the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued an interpretative statement12
clarifying that “[n]o provision of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement . . . limits a Tribunal’s discretion to accept written 
submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”13 This 
was the first binding interpretation to expressly allow for amicus curiae 
participation in investor-state arbitration, clearly stating that tribunals 
have a discretionary power to accept submissions from non-disputing 
parties. Such a degree of openness of the proceedings to third parties 
would had been unthinkable a decade before.14 For more than a decade, 
Canada and the United States have been making use of Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaties as a basis for negotiations of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) with other nations.15 These documents incorporate to a 
large extent the states’ experience with NAFTA.16 The Canada Model 
 10. United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal 
On Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. 
Trib.).
 11. Id.; Methanex Corp. v. USA (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.). 
 12. NAFTA, art. 1131(2) provides that an interpretation by the Commission of a 
provision of the agreement shall be binding on a tribunal established under section 11 of 
the NAFTA.  
 13. NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on 
Non-Disputing Party Participation (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/38791.pdf.
 14. Alessandra Asteriti & Christian J. Tams, Transparency and Representation of 
the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 787, 793 (Stephan Schill ed., 2010). 
 15. Canada Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2004, 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [hereinafter 
Canada Model BIT 2004]; United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2004, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf [hereinafter US Model BIT 
2004]; United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [hereinafter US Model BIT 
2012]. 
 16. Andrea J. Menaker, Benefiting from Experience: Developments in the United 
States’ Most Recent Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 121, 126 
(2005).
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BIT 200417 and the US Model BIT, both in its 2004 and 2012 versions,18
include express provisions on amicus curiae participation. 
The trend towards the admission of non-disputing parties in 
investment arbitration was reflected in the Arbitration Rules of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),19 the 
institution that administers most investment disputes. In its original 
version (1967) and subsequent amendments (1984 and 2002) there were 
no specific provisions referring to third-party participation in arbitral 
proceedings.20 This was in line with the common practice in investment 
treaties, which generally contained no express provision concerning 
submissions by non-parties. 
The first case under the ICSID Rules where third parties requested 
authorization to take part in the proceedings was the infamous case of 
Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia.21 Several non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and individuals submitted a petition to the tribunal 
requesting authorization to participate as parties – or, alternatively, to be 
granted amicus curiae status – invoking the public character of the 
dispute and the public interests that might be affected.22 The tribunal 
rejected the request for amicus curiae participation, reflecting the 
traditional tenets of confidentiality and party autonomy.23 Interpreting 
 17. Canada Model BIT 2004, supra note 15, at art. 39: Submissions by a Non-
Disputing Party. 
 18. US Model BIT 2004, supra note 15, at art. 28, ¶ 3: Conduct of the 
Arbitration; US Model BIT 2012, supra note 15, at art. 28, ¶ 3: Conduct of the 
Arbitration.
 19. See Int’l Ctr. for Settlem’t of Inv. Disputes (ICSID), ICSID Convention 
Arbitration Rules, http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/StaticFiles/ 
basicdoc/main-eng.htm [hereinafter ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules]. 
 20. Aurélia Antonietti, The 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and 
Regulations and the Additional Facility Rules, 21 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 427, 433 
(2006).
 21. See generally Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/3, (Aug. 29 2002), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0018.pdf. 
 22. Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, 
Petition by NGOs and People to Participate as an Intervening Party or Amici Curiae, ¶ 30 
(Aug. 29, 2002), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0018.pdf. 
 23. Letter from David D. Caron, Pres. of the Tribunal, ICSID, to J. Martin 
Wagner, Dir., Int’l Program, Earthjustice (Jan. 29, 2003), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0019_0.pdf (In re Aguas del 
Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bol.).
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these principles, the tribunal deferred to the parties, who unanimously 
opposed third party participation in the proceedings.24
The tribunal did not specifically rule on whether it could, on its own 
initiative, accept the amicus submission, having relied “on a rather 
restrictive interpretation of the consensual nature of investment 
arbitration.”25 The tribunal could have accepted third party submissions 
based on its broad procedural powers under article 34 of the ICSID 
Rules;26 instead, the tribunal decided to engage in a balancing exercise 
between the parties’ contractual right to resolve their dispute privately 
and the public interests associated with the dispute, ultimately deferring 
to the parties in case they wished to voluntarily waive their right to keep 
the proceedings confidential.27 Still, the tribunal made an interesting 
reference:
The Tribunal appreciates that you, and the organizations and 
individuals with whom you work, are concerned with the resolution of 
this dispute. The duties of the Tribunal, however, derive from the 
treaties which govern this particular dispute. It has been reported that 
the new bilateral investment treaty between Singapore and the United 
States contains provisions for the amicus participation of non-
governmental organizations. The duty of a tribunal in any case that 
arises under that instrument will be to follow its dictates. It is no less 
our duty to follow the structure and requirements of the instruments 
that control this case.28
The decision raised substantial criticism about the secrecy of ICSID 
proceedings, reinforcing the idea that such arbitrations involved nothing 
 24. Id.
 25. Eric De Brabandere, Non-State Actors in International Dispute Settlement: 
Pragmatism in International Law, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 342, 
352 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011). 
 26. Paul Friedland, The Amicus Role in International Arbitration, in PERVASIVE 
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 321, 326 (Julian D. Lew & Loukas A. 
Mistelis eds., 2006). 
 27. Epaminontas Triantafilou, Amicus Submissions in Investor-State Arbitration 
After Suez v. Argentina, 24 ARB. INT’L 571, 574 (2008). 
 28. Letter from David D. Caron to J. Martin Wagner, supra note 23. 
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beyond the parties29 and did not take public interests into account.30
Various groups denied amicus curiae status lambasted the decision as 
“profoundly undemocratic,” “inexcusable,” a “closed-door process,” and 
an “extreme example[] of excessive power granted to corporations.”31
The second time non-parties requested permission to take part in the 
proceedings as amicus curiae under the ICSID Rules was in the 
Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina case.32 In contrast with the decision of the 
Aguas del Tunari tribunal, the tribunal held that it had the power under 
Article 44 of the ICSID Convention (which grants the arbitral tribunal 
the power to decide on procedural questions that are not regulated by the 
rules of the ICSID Convention33) to grant amicus curiae submissions to 
suitable parties.34 The tribunal found that the case at hand was likely to 
trigger public concern because it regarded the “water distribution and 
sewage systems of a large metropolitan area.”35 “Any decision rendered 
in [the] case . . . ha[d] the potential to affect the operation of those 
systems and thereby the public they serve.”36
Given the public interest in the [dispute] . . . appropriate non-parties 
may be able to provide the Tribunal perspectives, arguments, and 
expertise that will help it arrive at a correct decision. . . . The 
 29. RENÉ URUEÑA, NO CITIZENS HERE: GLOBAL SUBJECTS AND PARTICIPATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (2012). 
 30. Loukas A. Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third-Party Participation: UPS v. 
Canada and Methanex Corp. v. USA, 21 ARB. INT’L 211, 223 (2005).  
 31. Secretive World Bank Tribunal Bans Public and Media Participation in 
Bechtel Lawsuit over Access to Water, EARTHJUSTICE (Feb. 12, 2003), 
http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2003/secretive-world-bank-tribunal-bans-public-and-
media-participation-in-bechtel-lawsuit-over-access-to-water. 
 32. See generally Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 
Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 
(May 19, 2005), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0815.pdf 
[hereinafter Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina]. 
 33. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), art. 44, Oct. 14, 1977, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20English.p
df.
 34. Suez/Vivendi v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in 
Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, ¶¶ 15, 24 
(May 19, 2005). 
 35. Id. ¶ 19. 
 36. Id.
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acceptance of amicus submissions would have the additional desirable 
consequence of increasing the transparency of investor-state 
arbitration.37
Based on a review of amicus practices in other jurisdictions and fora, 
the tribunal decided that the acceptance of amicus submissions should 
depend on three basic criteria: “a) the appropriateness of the subject 
matter of the case; b) the suitability of a given non-party to act as amicus 
curiae in that case, and c) the procedure by which the amicus submission 
was made and considered.”38
The third case where non-parties submitted a request for amicus 
curiae participation was Suez/InterAgua v. Argentina.39 The arbitral panel 
was exactly the same as in Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina, and the decision 
was closely similar.40 Even though the tribunal laid down the same three 
conditions for the potential amici as in Suez/Vivendi, it decided that the 
petitioners had only met the first of the three conditions.41 However, it 
was pointed out that petitioners could submit a new application for 
leave.42
As a result of the mounting pressure from scholars, practitioners, and 
commentators for greater public participation in investment arbitration 
proceedings,43 ICSID decided to amend its Arbitration Rules. The new 
 37. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22. 
 38. Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response 
to a Petition by Five Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to Make an 
Amicus Curiae Submission, ¶ 2 (Feb. 12, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0823.pdf. 
 39. See generally Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, 
Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Suez/InterAgua v. Argentina]. 
 40. Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Award (Apr. 9, 
2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4365.pdf.
 41. Suez/InterAgua v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in 
Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae, ¶ 33 (Mar. 17, 2006), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0803.pdf. 
 42. Id. ¶ 34. 
 43. See, e.g., Meg Kinnear, Transparency and Third Party Participation in 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/investment/ 
internationalinvestmentagreements/36979626.pdf; Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., 
Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Procedures, OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INT’L INV. NO. 2005/01 (2005), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/524613550768; Christina Knahr, Transparency, Third Party 
Participation and Access to Documents in International Investment Arbitration, 23 ARB.
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rules came into effect on the 10th of April 2006.44 The new paragraph two 
of Rule 37 (Visits and Inquiries; Submissions of Non-disputing Parties) 
provides: 
After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity 
that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the “non-disputing 
party”) to file a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter 
within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to allow such a 
filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to 
which: 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by 
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different 
from that of the disputing parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within 
the scope of the dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding. 
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does 
not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either 
party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to present their 
observations on the non-disputing party submission.45
The new rule makes an express reference to the participation of non-
disputing parties in arbitral proceedings, namely by allowing them to file 
written submissions.46 This basically corresponds to the figure of amicus 
curiae. It can be said that the new Rule 37(2) ratified past arbitral 
INT’L 327 (2007); Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment 
Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?,
41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 814 (2008); Daniel Barstow Magraw Jr. & Niranjali 
Manel Amerasinghe, Transparency and Public Participation in Investor-State 
Arbitration, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 337, 337-38 (2009); Nathalie Bernasconi-
Osterwalder, Transparency and Amicus Curiae in ICSID Arbitrations, in SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 191 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. 
eds., 2011). 
 44. ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, supra note 19.
 45. Id. at Rule 37(2). 
 46. See id.
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practice, as tribunals in the aforementioned cases had already recognized 
that they had the power to accept or refuse amicus submissions.47
Pursuant to Rule 37(2), the decision to accept or reject a submission is 
within the full discretion of the tribunal, even though there is the 
obligation to consult both parties first and to consider, among other 
things, the three factors mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c).48 The 
decision on whether to accept amicus curiae briefs cannot be vetoed by 
the parties.49 Naturally, if both parties object the tribunal may find it 
harder to justify the alleged advantages of third-party participation.50
Still, the final decision rests with the tribunal. 
Neither the 197651 nor the 201052 versions of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules contained express provisions on third-party 
participation. This made sense since these rules were originally designed 
for use in commercial arbitrations.53 Differently, the UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency), which came into force on April 1, 2014, were 
designed specifically for investor-state arbitrations.54 These rules apply to 
investment arbitrations “initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
 47. Jarrod Wong & Jason Yackee, The 2006 Procedural and Transparency-
Related Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules: Model Intentions, Moderate 
Proposals, and Modest Returns, in 2009-2010 Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 233, 268 (Karl 
P. Sauvant ed.).
 48. See Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 43, at 198; see ICSID Convention 
Arbitration Rules, supra note 19, at Rule 37(2). 
 49. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 43, at 198. 
 50. KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE,
ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 374 (2013). 
 51. See G.A. Res. 31/98, supra note 8. 
 52. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (As Revised in 2010), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf. 
 53. See G.A. Res. 31/98, supra note 8, which precedes the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, and refers to “commercial relations,” “arbitral institutions and centres 
of international commercial arbitration,” and “commercial contracts” in the preamble. 
The UNCITRAL itself recognizes that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules can be used 
“for the conduct of arbitral proceedings arising out of their commercial relationship.” 
UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 54. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-
State Arbitration, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/
2014Transparency.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
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Rules pursuant to [] treat[ies] . . . concluded on or after 1 April 2014 
unless the parties to the treaty have agreed otherwise.”55 In order to 
facilitate the application of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency to 
disputes arising under existing investment treaties, on December 10, 
2014 the United Nations adopted the United Nations Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the “Mauritius 
Convention on Transparency”).56 The convention allows parties to 
investment treaties concluded before April 1, 2014 to express their 
consent to apply the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency.57 It will “enter 
into force six months after the date of deposit of the third instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”58 The Convention seeks 
to facilitate the “opt-in process.”59 The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules 
are also “available for use in investor-State arbitrations initiated under 
rules other than the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or in ad hoc 
proceedings,” if the parties so agree.60
The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency cover all stages of the 
arbitration proceedings, including submissions to arbitral tribunals and 
arbitral awards.61 They also contain specific provisions on the 
participation of non-disputing third parties.62 Article 4 (submission by a 
third person) provides: 
 55. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (with New Article 1, Paragraph 
4, as Adopted in 2013) UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-
State Arbitration, art. 1.1, (2014) 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-
Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency]. The 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were amended in 2013, inserting a new article 1(4) that 
expressly incorporates the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency. See id.
 56. See United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-
State Arbitration, Dec. 10, 2014,  
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-
convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf. 
 57. Id. at art. 2.1. 
 58. Id. at art. 9.1. 
 59. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Rukia Baruti, Transparency in Investor-
State Arbitration: An Incremental Approach, 2 BCDR INT’L ARB. REV. 59, 60 (2015). 
 60. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 55, at art. 1.9. 
 61. Id. at arts. 3–4. 
 62. See Mariel Dimsey, Article 4. Submission by a Third Person, in
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: A GUIDE TO THE 
UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
128 (Dimitrij Euler et al. eds., 2015).
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1. After consultation with the disputing parties, the arbitral tribunal 
may allow a person that is not a disputing party, and not a non-
disputing Party to the treaty (“third person(s)”), to file a written 
submission with the arbitral tribunal regarding a matter within the 
scope of the dispute. 
2. A third person wishing to make a submission shall apply to the 
arbitral tribunal, and shall, in a concise written statement, which is in a 
language of the arbitration and complies with any page limits set by the 
arbitral tribunal: 
(a) Describe the third person, including, where relevant, its 
membership and legal status (e.g., trade association or other non-
governmental organization), its general objectives, the nature of its 
activities and any parent organization (including any organization that 
directly or indirectly controls the third person); 
(b) Disclose any connection, direct or indirect, which the third person 
has with any disputing party; 
(c) Provide information on any government, person or organization that 
has provided to the third person (i) any financial or other assistance in 
preparing the submission; or (ii) substantial assistance in either of the 
two years preceding the application by the third person under this 
article (e.g. funding around 20 per cent of its overall operations 
annually);
(d) Describe the nature of the interest that the third person has in the 
arbitration; and 
(e) Identify the specific issues of fact or law in the arbitration that the 
third person wishes to address in its written submission. 
3. In determining whether to allow such a submission, the arbitral 
tribunal shall take into consideration, among other factors it determines 
to be relevant: 
(a) Whether the third person has a significant interest in the arbitral 
proceedings; and 
(b) The extent to which the submission would assist the arbitral tribunal 
in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the arbitral 
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proceedings by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight 
that is different from that of the disputing parties.63
The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency are a powerful example of 
how entrenched the figure of amicus curiae is in contemporary legal 
instruments on investment arbitration. Benefitting from the stamp of the 
United Nations, and with a scope of application potentially magnified by 
the Mauritius Convention on Transparency, the Rules constitute an 
unprecedented effort towards the consolidation of the principles of 
transparency and openness of investment arbitration at a worldwide 
scale. 
While arbitral rules and investment treaties do not specifically refer to 
this possibility, arbitral tribunals can also take the initiative of inviting 
amicus curiae submissions.64 This is in line with the opening of arbitral 
proceedings to the community at large. If arbitrators notice that the 
dispute before them may be of interest for NGOs, civil society groups, or 
other entities, they can release a public notice inviting them to apply for 
amicus curiae status, disclosing the requirements for such application.65
This contributes to the transparency of proceedings and adds a dynamic 
nature to amicus curiae participation in investment arbitration. 
As demonstrated, the last 15 years witnessed a growing movement in 
favor of greater public participation in investor-state arbitration. This 
momentous change has been hailed as “one of the most important 
evolutions weathered by international law in recent decades,”66 a 
“groundbreaking”67 and “fascinating development.”68 Amicus curiae 
 63. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 55, at art. 4. 
 64. Press Release, ICSID, Procedural Order Regarding Amici Curiae (Feb. 2, 
2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0608.pdf (regarding 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12). A similar invitation was made by the tribunal in Eli Lilly 
and Co. v. Canada. Press Release, ICSID, Eli Lilly and Company v. Government of 
Canada (ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2) – Amici Curiae (Nov. 5, 2015), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/Pages/News.aspx?CID=169&ListID=74f1e8b5
-96d0-4f0a-8f0c-2f3a92d84773&variation=en_us. See also UNIDROIT, supra note 2, §
13 cmt. P-13B. 
 65. See id.
 66. Eric De Brabandere, NGOs and the “Public Interest”: The Legality and 
Rationale of Amicus Curiae Interventions in International Economic and Investment 
Disputes, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 85, 112 (2011). 
 67. Id.
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participation is considered “an entrenched”69 or “routine and 
standardized feature of investor-state arbitration,”70 a symbol of the 
“emergence in international law of the idea of civil society”71 or even of 
“the arrival of the golden age of civil society participation into investor-
state arbitration.”72
The identity of amici curiae may be extremely varied. Therefore, 
definitions of this figure normally do not make any reference to a 
specific category of individuals or organizations that may play the role of 
“friends of the court.” It is not adequate for arbitral rules or investment 
treaties to limit ex ante the typology of subjects who can request 
authorization to participate in the proceedings.73 The perspectives 
advocated by the amici curiae may be so diverse that there should be 
ample personal legitimation in this field.74 In most cases applicants 
include NGOs and civil society groups.75 Normally candidates “pretend 
to represent the interests of all or part of the civil society.”76 Amici may 
therefore introduce themselves as advocates for the environment, public 
 68. Catherine Kessedjian, Sir Kenneth Bailey Memorial Lecture: Dispute 
Resolution in a Complex International Society, 29 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 765, 775 
(2005).
 69. J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-
State Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 McGILL 
L.J. 681, 720 (2007). 
 70. Charles H. Brower, II, Introductory Note to International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United 
Republic of Tanzania, ICSID case no. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5, 46 INT’L
LEGAL MATERIALS 572 (2007). 
 71. Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International 
Investment Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 729, 742 (2009). 
 72. Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in 
Investment Dispute Settlement, 26 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 251, 264 (2007). 
 73. See Katia Fach Gómez, Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in 
International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public 
Interest, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 510, 556 (2012). 
 74. Id.
 75. Amokura Kawharu, Participation of Non-governmental Organizations in 
Investment Arbitration as Amici Curiae, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 275 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010). 
 76. Alexis Mourre, Are Amici Curiae the Proper Response to the Public’s 
Concerns on Transparency in Investment Arbitration?, 5 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. &
TRIBUNALS 257, 266 (2006). 
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health, workers rights, and other social concerns.77 “[P]rofessional 
associations, trade unions, private companies, scholars, law school 
clinics, [and] law firms” have also been granted amicus curiae status.78
Over the last several years, a new category of amicus curiae has 
emerged: intergovernmental organizations. Notably, the European 
Union, through the European Commission (EC), has requested and been 
granted authorization to take part in several investment proceedings.79
This is a facet of the European Union’s increasing interest in foreign 
investment law and arbitration. Foreign direct investment is a 
fundamental engine for the competitiveness of the European economy,80
as the European Union is the biggest investor and recipient of foreign 
direct investment worldwide.81 With the entry into force, on December 1, 
2009, of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union acquired exclusive 
competence on foreign direct investment.82 This means that negotiations 
 77. See Christian Schlieman, Requirements for Amicus Curiae Participation in 
International Investment Arbitration: A Deconstruction of the Procedural Wall Erected 
in Joint ICSID Cases ARB/10/25 and ARB/10/15, 12 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 
365, 374 (2013). 
 78. Gómez, supra note 73, at 556. 
 79. See infra Sec. II. 
 80. See Fabienne Ilzkovitz et al., Steps Towards a Deeper Economic Integration: 
The Internal Market in the 21st Century, in European Economy: European Commission 
Economic Papers at 8 (Jan. 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ 
publication784_en.pdf. 
 81. Economic and Financial Affairs: Foreign Direct Investment, EUROPEAN 
COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/globalisation/fdi/index_en.htm (last 
updated Oct. 27, 2014). 
 82. Consolidated Version of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 207, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 49; see generally, ANGELOS DIMOPOULOS, EU FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW (2011); see also Ulrich Wölker, The EU as a Player in the BIT Arena: 
Current and Future Legal Challenges, 24 ICSID REV. 434 (2009); Jan Kleinheisterkamp, 
The Future of the BITs of European Member States After Lisbon, 29 ASA BULL. 212 
(2011); Wenhua Shan & Sheng Zhang, The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way Toward a 
Common Investment Policy, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1049, 1049 (2011); Angelos Dimopoulos, 
Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the Post-Lisbon Era of External 
Relations, in EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-LISBON ERA 401, 
401 (Paul James Cardwell ed., 2012); Chien-Huei Wu, Foreign Direct Investment as 
Common Commercial Policy: EU External Economic Competence After Lisbon, in EU
EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-LISBON ERA 375, 375 (Paul James 
Cardwell ed., 2012); see Anna De Luca, New Developments on the Scope of the EU 
Common Commercial Policy Under the Lisbon Treaty: Investment Liberalization vs. 
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on investment with third states are to be pursued at the European level. 
The European Union has recently concluded negotiations for Free Trade 
Agreements, which include investment chapters with Canada 
(Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement – CETA) and Vietnam 
(EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement), and is currently negotiating 
similar arrangements with other countries, most notably the United States 
of America (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership).83
Participation in investment proceedings as amicus curiae is part of the 
European Union’s broader incursion into the realm of investment law 
and arbitration. The EC has been demonstrating growing interest in 
participating in arbitral proceedings.84 This interest is explained by 
different reasons. First, as will be discussed below, in some cases the 
dispute between the foreign investor and the host state raises matters 
pertaining to the interpretation and application of European Law, 
particularly where the defendant is an European Union member state and 
the impugned state measure was adopted in compliance with or in order 
to execute European Union law.85 Second, several disputes regarding 
investments in the field of energy have emerged over the past years, most 
of them under the rules of the Energy Charter Treaty,86 a multilateral 
Investment Protection?, in 2010-2011 Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 165 (Karl P. Sauvant 
ed., 2012); Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on 
Foreign Investment—How Will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging 
Global Regime?, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 51, 52 (2012); August Reinisch, The EU on the 
Investment Path – Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and Other Investment 
Agreements, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 111, 115 (2014); Mark A. Clodfelter, The
Future Direction of Investment Agreements in the European Union, 12 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 159, 161 (2014); Julie A. Maupin, Where Should Europe’s Investment Path 
Lead? Reflections on August Reinisch, “Quo Vadis Europe?”, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L
L. 183, 185 (2014); Thomas Kendra & Lara Kozyreff, The Future of Investment 
Protection in Europe – The EU Takes Control, in 3 Y.B. INT’L ARB. 239, 239 (Marianne 
Roth & Michael Geistlinger eds., 2013); Alfredo Rizzo, Legal Foundations of the 
Competence of the European Union on Foreign Direct Investments, in 23 IT. Y.B. INT’L
L.131, 131 (Benedetto Conforti & Luigi Ferrari Bravo eds., 2014). 
 83. See Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/ 
december/tradoc_118238.pdf (last updated Sept. 2016). 
 84. Daniel Behn, Legitimacy, Evolution, and Growth in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Empirically Evaluating the State-of-the-Art, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363, 382 
(2015).
 85. See infra Sec. III. 
 86. The International Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95. 
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treaty that entered into force in 1998, establishing a legal framework to 
promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, and to which the 
European Union and its member states are parties.87 Finally, the 
participation of the European Union in proceedings between member 
states and third countries is required by Regulation (EU) No. 1219/2012 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, of December 12, 2012, 
which establishes “transitional arrangements for [BITS] between 
Member States and third countries.”88
 87. See, e.g., INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY
(Graham Coop & Clarisse Ribeiro eds., 2008); THOMAS ROE & MATTHEW HAPPOLD,
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (2011); 
Andrei Konoplyanik & Thomas Wälde, Energy Charter Treaty and its Role in 
International Energy, 24 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES 523, 523 (2006); Justin 
D’Agostino & Oliver Jones, Energy Charter Treaty: A Step towards Consistency in 
International Investment Arbitration?, 25 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES 225, 225 (2007).
 88. 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1, 40–46. Pursuant to article 13(b), member states shall 
“immediately inform the Commission of any request for dispute settlement lodged under 
the auspices of the bilateral investment agreement as soon as the Member State becomes 
aware of such a request. The Member State and the Commission shall fully cooperate and 
take all necessary measures to ensure an effective defence which may include, where 
appropriate, the participation in the procedure by the Commission.” Paragraph (c) adds 
that member states shall “seek the agreement of the Commission before activating any 
relevant mechanisms for dispute settlement against a third country included in the 
bilateral investment agreement and shall, where requested by the Commission, activate 
such mechanisms. Those mechanisms shall include consultations with the other party to a 
bilateral investment agreement and dispute settlement where provided for in the 
agreement. The Member State and the Commission shall fully cooperate in the conduct of 
procedures within the relevant mechanisms, which may include, where appropriate, the 
participation in the relevant procedures by the Commission.” The regime of cooperation 
between the EC and member states is complemented by Regulation (EU) No. 912/2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 23 July 2014, which establishes a 
framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute 
settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the Union is party, 
or the Union and its Member States are parties, and initiated by a claimant of a third 
country. 2014 O.J. (L 257) 121–34. Pursuant to the first paragraph of article 10, where a 
Member State acts as the respondent, in all phases of the dispute, including possible 
annulment, appeal or review, the member state shall: “(a) provide the Commission in a 
timely manner with relevant documents relating to the proceeding; (b) inform the 
Commission in a timely manner of all significant procedural steps, and upon request enter 
into consultations with the Commission with a view to taking into due consideration any 
point of law or any other element of Union interest raised by the dispute and identified by 
the Commission in a non-binding written analysis provided to the Member State 
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The EC has already requested permission from arbitral tribunals to 
intervene as amicus curiae in several cases.89 This is a significant 
development as it means that amicus curiae status is not an exclusive of 
non-governmental or private organizations.90 It also represents critical 
progress in the use of arbitral rules—namely the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules—as it was probably never imagined that such institutions would 
make use of this procedural mechanism.91 The emergence of new 
categories of entities seeking access to investment arbitration “raises 
complex questions regarding the nature of the interests” that such entities 
pursue, the potential impact that their involvement might have in the 
proceedings, and “the different forms that their participation should take 
in the future.”92
The purpose of this paper is to examine the participation of the EC in 
investor-state arbitrations and, despite the scarcity of information 
available about some cases, assess its impact in the overall mechanism of 
investor-state dispute resolution. The article proceeds as follows. Part I 
discusses the main theoretical and practical benefits that have led to the 
introduction of provisions allowing for amicus curiae participation in 
investment arbitration. Such arguments are crucial as they justify and 
legitimize this mechanism, validating the existence of a fundamental 
deviation from the traditional confidential and consensual nature of 
arbitration. Part II reviews the cases where the EC requested 
authorization from tribunals to take part in arbitral proceedings. Part III 
then moves to discuss the role played by the EC in those disputes. The 
participation of this special entity in investment arbitrations may raise 
concerned; and (c) permit representatives of the Commission, at its request and its own 
expense to form part of the delegation representing the Member State.” 
 89. See infra Sec. II. 
 90. Lucas Bastin, Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration: Eight Recent 
Trends, 30 ARB. INT’L 125, 130 (2014). 
 91. Ciaran Cross & Christian Schliemann-Radbruch, When Investment 
Arbitration Curbs Domestic Regulatory Space: Consistent Solutions through Amicus
Curiae Submissions by Regional Organisations, 6 L. & DEV. REV. 67, 96 (2013).
 92. Epaminontas Triantafilou, A More Expansive Role For Amici Curiae In 
Investment Arbitration?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May 11, 2009), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2009/05/11/a-more-expansive-role-for-amici-curiae-in-
investment-arbitration; Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment 
Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation, 29 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 200, 201 (2011). 
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concerns regarding its impact on the overall efficiency of the dispute 
settlement mechanism. It is argued that the EC is fundamentally a 
distinct type of amicus, as it pursues interests different from those 
characteristic of NGOs and civil society groups. This part also examines 
the range of participatory rights that have been granted to the EC and 
discusses the impact of the EC’s intervention on the proceedings and on 
the outcome of the dispute. Part IV concludes by offering some final 
remarks. 
I. BENEFITS OF THE AMICUS CURIAE MECHANISM
The investor-state dispute resolution system has changed profoundly 
over the last several years, shifting from a confidentiality-based 
archetype, tributary of the commercial roots of investment arbitration, to 
a model that is open, subject to certain requirements, to the participation 
of non-disputing parties. This momentous change in the philosophy and 
structure of investment arbitration, ignited by some pioneer arbitral 
decisions, was duly acknowledged and incorporated by states in their 
international investment agreements and by arbitral institutions in their 
arbitral rules. This reform process was supported by the conviction 
among scholars, parties, and practitioners that investment arbitration had 
to change significantly so as to accommodate the aspirations and 
concerns of the overall community. Four main theoretical justifications 
have been articulated to explain the need for amicus curiae involvement 
in investor-state arbitration. 
First, it is argued that amicus curiae participation increases the 
transparency of the dispute resolution system.93 Over the last several 
years transparency became “[o]ne of the most topical issues in 
 93. Levine, supra note 92, at 200, 206; De Brabandere, supra note 66, at 102; see 
Eric De Brabandere, Non-State Actors and the Proliferation and Individualization of 
International Dispute Settlement, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO NON-STATE 
ACTORS 347-59 (Bob Reinalda ed., 2010); see Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, 
Transparency and Amicus Curiae Briefs, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 333 (2004); see 
Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency Versus Confidentiality in 
International Investment Arbitration – The Biwater Gauff Compromise, 6 L. & PRAC.
INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 97 (2007); Lucas Bastin, The Amicus Curiae in Investor-State 
Arbitration, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 208, 223 (2012). 
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international economic law,”94 as it is perceived as a fundamental tool to 
enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the system.95 In the realm of 
investment law and arbitration, the concept can be used to refer to the 
obligation of host states to publish all legal rules affecting investors and 
to the existence of transparency in the conduction of arbitral 
proceedings.96 In the latter sense, transparency entails not only that the 
general public is aware of the existence of an arbitration and its contents, 
but also that it can have access to the proceedings.97 Investment disputes 
should not be decided in a process that was originally designed to 
address private controversies, focusing on commercial considerations, 
without due regard to the importance of transparency for democratic 
governance.98 The involvement of amicus curiae draws the general 
public’s attention to a controversy that may have a significant impact on 
public interests and public finances.99 Naturally, transparency and public 
participation are deeply related. Public participation is a form of 
transparency and, in order for it to be effective, it is necessary that 
participating parties have access to the information that exists in the 
proceedings.100
Second, the participation of third-parties is said to promote greater 
accountability of investor-state arbitration.101 The arbitral tribunal is 
called upon to scrutinize the conduct of the host state against the 
 94. Marc Bungenberg, Towards a More Balanced International Investment Law 
2.0?, 2015 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE: TRADE POLICY BETWEEN LAW,
DIPLOMACY AND SCHOLARSHIP) 15, 31 (Christoph Herrmann et al. eds.,). 
 95. N. Jansen Calamita, Dispute Settlement Transparency in Europe’s Evolving 
Investment Treaty Policy: Adopting the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules Approach, 15 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 645, 651 (2014); Frank J. Garcia et al., Reforming the 
International Investment Regime: Lessons from International Trade Law, 18 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 861, 887 (2016); Catharine Titi, International Investment Law and Good 
Governance, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A HANDBOOK 1768 (Marc 
Bungenberg et al. eds. 2015). 
 96. Calamita, supra note 95, at 649.  
 97. Id.; Loretta Malintoppi & Natalie Limbasan, Living in Glass Houses? The 
Debate on Transparency in International Investment Arbitration, 2 BCDR INT’L ARB.
REV. 31, 32 (2015). 
 98. Choudhury, supra note 43, at 782. 
 99. Malintoppi & Limbasan, supra note 97, at 31. 
 100. Id. at 32, n. 5.  
 101. Choudhury, supra note 43, at 808; VanDuzer, supra note 69, at 685; Bastin, 
supra note 93, at 227; Kawharu, supra note 75, at 285. 
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standards of protection prescribed in international investment 
agreements.102 State respondents face liability that can rise to several 
million of dollars, which can produce a tremendous impact on that state’s 
budget.103 Moreover, the outcome of the proceedings “may limit the 
future legislative and/or administrative freedom of manoeuver” of states, 
affecting their ability to pursue public welfare policies.104 The 
community has an interest in checking that vital decisions are made 
using proper procedures and taking due account of public concerns.
Amicus curiae intervention gives citizens a chance to be informed about 
the behavior of governments and arbitral tribunals.105 The participation of 
non-disputing parties in the proceedings may help to address a 
democratic deficit that has been identified in the system.106
Third, it is posited that amicus curiae participation increases the 
openness of investment treaty arbitration to input from civil society.107
Matters of public interest are almost always at the heart of the dispute 
because its subject matter impacts on the provision of public services 
such as water, waste management, electricity, or gas; or touches upon 
sensitive matters such as environmental protection, labor standards and 
other socio-political concerns—which are normally absent from 
 102. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 233–34 (2007); see also RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH 
SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 133, 133 (2008). 
 103. Asteriti & Tams, supra note 14, at 792. 
 104. Knahr & Reinisch, supra note 93, at 113; Miles, supra note 50, at 373–74.
 105. Triantafilou, supra note 27 at 575; Stephan W. Schill, International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law—An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 3, 14–15 (Stephan Schill ed., 2010). 
 106. See Choudhury, supra note 43; Triantafilou, supra note 27 at 575; Omari 
Scott Simmons, Picking Friends from the Crowd: Amicus Participation as Political 
Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185, 187 (2009); Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richard, 
Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment Arbitration?, in THE BACKLASH 
AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 253, 257 (Michael 
Waibel et al. eds., 2010); Chiara Ragni, The Role of Amicus Curiae in Investment 
Disputes: Striking a Balance Between Confidentiality and Broader Policy 
Considerations, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMON CONCERNS
86, 87 (Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2013). 
 107. Levine, supra note 92, at 217; De Brabandere, supra note 25, at 353; MARIEL 
DIMSEY, THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CHALLENGES AND 
SOLUTIONS 111–12 (2008).  
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international commercial arbitration.108 Oftentimes parties fail to 
introduce an accurate background of the dispute and their pleadings are 
“insufficient to provide the Tribunal with an exhaustive picture of the 
issues involved.”109 Amici may draw the attention of the tribunal to the 
“broader implications of a decision beyond the particular interests of the 
[disputing] parties.”110 This is crucial when matters under discussion 
touch upon crucial spheres of regulatory authority.111
Amicus participation may contribute to decisions that are more likely 
to be informed by, and responsive to, a wide range of interests, especially 
taking into account that generally civil society groups are better 
positioned to voice public concerns.112 They can bring with them 
different social, non-economic perspectives and thus promote a 
competition of ideas.113 It has been said that third–party participation 
“may bridge the gap between the legal procedures and the global or 
national public.”114 Amici curiae, to a certain extent, represent diverse 
public interest considerations,115 acting as a sort of “trustees” for the 
 108. Asteriti & Tams, supra note 14, at 792; Malintoppi & Limbasan, supra note
97, at 31–32; Mistelis, supra note 30, at 230. 
 109. Martins Paparinskis, Inherent Powers of ICSID Tribunals: Broad and Rightly 
So, in 5 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 20 (Ian A. 
Laird & Todd J. Weiler eds., 2011). 
 110. Tomoko Ishikawa, Third Party Participation in Investment Arbitration, 59 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 373, 403 (2010); Brigitte Stern, The Future of International 
Investment Law: A Balance Between the Protection of Investors and the States’ Capacity 
to Regulate, in THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS,
REALTIES, OPTIONS 174, 188 (Jose Alvarez et al. eds., 2011); Dinah Shelton, The 
Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings,
88 AM. J. INT’L L. 611, 618 (1994); Epaminontas Triantafilou, Is a Connection to the 
“Public Interest” a Meaningful Prerequisite of Third Party Participation in Investment 
Arbitration? 5 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 38, 42 (2010). 
 111. Bastin, supra note 93, at 224.  
 112. Ishikawa, supra note 110, at 402; Hilary French, The Role of Non-State 
Actors, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 251, 256 (Jacob Werksman ed., 
2009).
 113. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 93, at 335. 
 114. Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, International Courts as Lawmakers, in
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ROOM FOR INNOVATIONS? 161, 209 (Rudiger 
Wolfrum & Ina Gätzschmann eds., 2012). 
 115. Triantafilou, supra note 27, at 574–75; Mary E. Footer, Bits and Pieces: 
Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation of Foreign Investment, 18 MICH.
ST. J. INT’L L. 33, 46 (2009). 
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protection of collective interests.116 “[T]here is a need for some sort of 
avocat general to voice the concerns of the public,” and that function is 
performed, in the absence of an alternative, by the amicus curiae.117 Non-
parties “may also provide a measure of access to a particular third party 
whose interests may be affected by the decision because of their close 
relationship with the dispute.”118 Overall, the participation of non-
disputing parties in the proceedings enlarges the number of stakeholders 
taking part in the proceedings, allowing for the introduction of public 
interests and common concerns in the arbitration system.119
Finally, amicus curiae participation has also been justified as a way to 
help investment tribunals to render better awards.120 While arbitrators are 
required to have appropriate qualifications and experience, this does not 
mean that they are necessarily able to understand all the aspects of a 
dispute.121 Arbitral panels may have limited ability to collect their own 
information on the subject-matter of the dispute.122 Many NGOs and civil 
society groups have a unique capacity to provide relevant information 
because of their substantial level of funding and technical expertise,123
 116. Andrea Bianchi, The Fight for Inclusion: Non-State Actors and International 
Law, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTERESTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE 
BRUNO SIMMA 39, 50 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011). 
 117. Id.; Mitsuo Matsushita, Transparency, Amicus Curiae Briefs and Third Party 
Rights, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 337, 338 (2004). 
 118. Ishikawa, supra note 110, at 403; see Bartholomeusz, supra note 3, at 211. 
 119. Ragni, supra note 106, at 87; see Magraw Jr. & Amerasinghe, supra note 43, 
at 343. 
 120. Comment P-13A to the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure states: 
“The ‘amicus curiae brief’ is a useful means by which a nonparty may supply the court 
with information and legal analysis that may be helpful to achieve a just and informed 
disposition of the case.” UNIDROIT, supra note 2. The submission may concern 
“important legal issues in the proceeding and matters of background information.” Id. at 
P-13. See also PAUL COLLINS JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS
AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 3 (2008). 
 121. Gómez, supra note 73, at 544.  
 122. Ishikawa, supra note 110, at 402.  
 123. Id. at 402–03; Christina Knahr, The New Rules on Participation of Non-
Disputing Parties in ICSID Arbitration: Blessing or Curse?, in EVOLUTION IN 
INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 319, 335 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles 
eds., 2011); Vernon Tava, The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations, Peoples and 
Courts in Implementing International Environmental Laws, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 123, 126 (Shawcat Alam et al. eds., 2013). 
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offering a low-cost tool for information gathering.124 Moreover, for 
different reasons parties to the dispute may lack either the necessary 
ability or the appropriate incentives to submit all of the relevant facts,125
legal arguments, and policy implications to the tribunal.126 Amici can 
draw the attention of arbitrators to interests that do not necessarily 
coincide with those of the state,127 providing the tribunal with its 
scientific or technical knowledge and offering an additional lawyer of 
information relevant to the dispute.128 The intervenor can provide the 
tribunal with its expert scientific or technical knowledge,129 which may 
be particularly important when the topics under discussion are beyond 
the arbitrators’ field of expertise, or are novel and complex.130
By bringing into the proceedings novel legal and factual information 
relevant to a decision, amici may help in improving the epistemic quality 
of decisions.131 They can present evidence relevant for the decision of the 
dispute132 or introduce legal arguments or perspectives not addressed by 
 124. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 93, at 335; Magraw Jr. & Amerasinghe, 
supra note 43, at 346. 
 125. Comment P-13D to the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure provides: 
“Principle 13 does not authorize third persons to present written submissions concerning 
the facts in dispute. It permits only presentation of data, background information, 
remarks, legal analysis, and other considerations that may be useful for a fair and just 
decision of the case. For example, a trade organization might give notice of special trade 
customs to the court.” UNIDROIT, supra note 2. Comment P-13B adds that “[f]actual 
assertions in an amicus brief are not evidence in the case.” Id.
 126. Shelton, supra note 110, at 615; Wong & Yackee, supra note 47, at 250–51; 
Ishikawa, supra note 110, at 393, 402. 
 127. Markus Gehring & Avidan Kent, International Investment Agreements and 
Sustainable Development: Future Pathways, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 561, 571 (Shawkat Alam et al. eds., 2013). 
 128. Magraw Jr. & Amerasinghe, supra note 43, at 346–47. 
 129. Shelton, supra note 110, at 611; Bartholomeusz, supra note 3, at 211; De 
Brabandere, supra note 66, at 106–07. 
 130. Ishikawa, supra note 110, at 402–03. 
 131. Jens Steffek & Maria Paola Ferretti, Accountability or “Good Decisions”? 
The Competing Goals of Civil Society Participation in International Governance, 23 
GLOBAL SOC’Y 37, 37 (2009); Magraw Jr. & Amerasinghe, supra note 43, at 346–47. 
 132. Rahim Moloo, Evidentiary Issues Arising in an Investment Arbitration, in
LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 287, 310 
(Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2014). 
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the parties in their own submissions.133 This might open the door for 
some “creative legal thinking,”134 grant third parties a role in investment 
treaty arbitration—and, in a broader sense, in the making of international 
policy and law135—and possibly even contribute to reduce the perceived 
fragmentation of international law.136 Hence, third party involvement 
“serves both to improve the legal quality of the award and to assist in the 
systemic development of international investment law as a whole.”137
II. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S PARTICIPATION IN INVESTMENT 
PROCEEDINGS
The EC has thus far requested authorization to participate in investor-
state arbitrations as amicus curiae in (at least) eleven cases.138 The EC is 
 133. Magraw Jr. & Amerasinghe, supra note 43, at 347; Ishikawa, supra note 110, 
at 402. 
 134. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 93, at 335. 
135. Ishikawa, supra note 110, at 377. 
 136. See Bartholomeusz, supra note 3, at 278. 
 137. Levine, supra note 92, at 217. 
 138. Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19; AES 
Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22 [hereinafter, 
AES v. Hung.]; Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20; Achmea B.V. v. The 
Slovak Republic (formerly Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic), PCA Case No. 2008-13 
[hereinafter, Achmea v. Slovak]; European American Inv. Bank AG v. Slovak Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2010-17 [hereinafter, European American Inv. Bank v. Slovak]; U.S. Steel 
Glob. Holdings I B.V. (Neth.) v. Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-6 [hereinafter, 
U.S. Steel v. Slovak]; Iberdrola Energía, S.A. v. Republic of Guat., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/5 [hereinafter, Iberdrola v. Guat.]; Charanne B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, Arb. 
Inst. Stockholm Chamber of Com. Case No. 062/2012 [hereinafter, Charanne v. Spain]; 
Antin Infrastructure Servs. Lux. S.à.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/31 [hereinafter, Antin v. Spain]; Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36 [hereinafter, Eiser v. Spain]. The EC has also intervened in 
EDF International S.A. v. Republic of Hung., UNCITRAL Rules, Award (Dec. 4, 2014), 
but no further information is available. See Commission Decision (EC) C(2014) 1676 
Final of Mar. 18, 2014, 3, n.5, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2014/EN/3-
2014-1676-EN-F1-1.PDF. See also U.S. Steel v. Slovak, Procedural Order No. 6 
(Stipulated Termination Order), (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3237.pdf. Eastern Sugar 
B.V (Neth.) v. Czech Republic (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber of Com. Case No. 
088/2004) is frequently mentioned as the first case of intervention of the EC as an amicus 
curiae in investment arbitration proceedings. In fact, the EC played an indirect role in the 
proceedings as it submitted a letter to the Czech Deputy Minister of Finance, which is 
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also reported to have sought leave to intervene in investment proceedings 
initiated by photovoltaic energy investors against Spain139 and the Czech 
Republic,140 but there is no further information available. Non-disputing 
party applications have been filed to intervene in other energy-related 
ICSID cases against Spain141 and Italy,142 yet it remains unclear whether 
these applications have been filed by the EC, due to the fact that this 
information has not been made available to the public. The cases where 
information is available are discussed in the pages that follow. 
On September 3, 2008, the ICSID Secretariat received an application 
from the EC, under ICSID Arbitration Rule 37(2), to file a written 
submission as a non-disputing party in Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary.143 The 
EC believed that it could  
discussed in the partial award of Mar. 27, 2007 ¶ 119, 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0259_0.pdf. However, the 
EC did not formally request authorization from the tribunal to participate in the 
proceedings as amicus curiae. 
 139. Isolux Infrastructure Neth. B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain (Arb. Inst. Stockholm 
Chamber of Com.) (case registered Oct. 3, 2013). See Valentina Vadi, Beyond Known 
Worlds: Climate Change Governance by Arbitral Tribunals?, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1285, 1341 (2015). 
 140. See Antaris Solar v. Czech Republic (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013); Natland Inv. Grp. 
NV v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL Rules)(2013); Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech 
Republic (UNCITRAL Rules)(2013); ICW Europe Invs. Ltd. V. Czech Republic 
(UNCITRAL Rules)(2013); Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. Czech Republic 
(UNCITRAL Rules)(2013); WA Invs.-Europa Nova Ltd. V. Czech Republic 
(UNCITRAL Rules)(2013). See also Pietro Ortolani, Intra-EU Arbitral Awards vis-à-vis 
Article 107 TFEU: State Aid Law as a Limit to Compliance, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
118, 126 (2015). 
 141. RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/30; Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/14/1; NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/14/11; InfraRed Environmental Infrastructure GP Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ABR/14/12; RENERGY S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/18. See Decisions on Non-Disputing Party Participation, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/Process/Decisions-on-Non-Disputing-Party-
Participation.aspx. 
 142. Blusun S.A. v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3. 
 143. Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 
Procedural Order No. 4 (Apr. 28, 2009), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC7386_En&caseId
=C111.
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assist the Tribunal in the determination of a number of legal issues 
arising under the Energy Charter Treaty in these proceedings . . . and 
would seek to address the question whether an ICSID Tribunal has or 
should exercise jurisdiction over disputes between an investor from an 
EU Member State against an EU Member State under the Energy 
Charter Treaty, including on matters that substantially fall under 
Community competence, and that it would also address the question of 
the applicable law in this dispute and how possible conflicts between 
several bodies of applicable law should be resolved.144
After considering the parties’ oral and written submissions, the 
tribunal issued a procedural order deciding 
in principle to allow the European Commission, as a non-disputing 
party . . . to file a written submission to the Tribunal regarding a legal 
matter within the scope of the Parties’ dispute . . . subject to the 
Tribunal hereafter first determining the practicalities and timing of such 
a submission in further consultation with the Parties, bearing in mind 
the factors listed in the last paragraph of Rule 37(2).145
After receiving observations and proposals from the parties, the 
tribunal issued another procedural order allowing the EC to file a written 
submission as a non-disputing party.146
In September 2008, the EC also requested leave to participate as a 
non-disputing party in AES v. Hungary.147 Later that month the EC was 
notified to clarify some aspects of its application.148 The EC’s response 
was communicated to the parties, who were given the chance to submit 
comments on the application.149 The arbitral tribunal then issued a 
procedural order allowing the EC to file a submission “within certain 
 144. Id. ¶ 2. 
 145. Electrabel v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Procedural Order No. 1, ¶ 
4C (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7050.pdf.
 146. Electrabel v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Procedural Order No. 4, ¶ 
22.
 147. AES v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 3.18 (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0014_0.pdf. 
 148. Id.
 149. Id.
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prescribed limits.”150 The EC filed a written submission151 and each party 
was given to opportunity to offer their observations on the submission.152
On April 2, 2009 the EC sought to intervene in Micula v. Romania.153
The claimants opposed the request.154 Romania argued that the EC’s 
request was “one that could not be reasonably opposed, but in the event 
that the Claimants opposed that request, it requested the opportunity to 
provide a fuller response.”155 After considering the competing claims, the 
tribunal accepted the EC’s participation in the case as a non-disputing 
party.156 The tribunal eventually issued a final award against Romania,157
which Romania sought to have annulled.158 In May 2014, the EC 
formally enjoined Romania from satisfying the ICSID award, claiming 
that the award was compensation for incentives that Romania had to 
remove in order to join the European Union; and therefore, any payment 
of compensation for the withdrawal of such illegal state-aid would be 
considered illegal state aid itself. 159 As a part of the annulment 
proceedings initiated by Romania, the EC submitted an application to 
intervene a second time as a non-disputing party.”160 This request was 
accepted by the ad hoc committee.161 The EC also submitted an amicus 
curiae brief in support of Romania before the United States Court of 
Appeals.162
 150. Id. ¶ 3.22. 
 151. Id. ¶ 3.25. 
 152. Id. ¶ 3.27. 
 153. Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, ¶ 23 (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3036.pdf. 
 154. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. 
 155. Id. ¶ 23. 
 156. Id. ¶ 27. 
 157. See generally Id.
 158. Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 1 
(Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw7161.pdf. 
 159. European Commission Letter to Romania on State Aid Investigation C(2014) 
6848 final, State aid SA.38517(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) – Romania Implementation of 
Arbitral award Micula v. Romania of 11 December 2013 (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4066.pdf. 
 160. Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 53. 
 161. Id. ¶ 61. 
 162. Brief for European Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, 
Micula v. Rom., No. 15 Misc. 107(LGS), 2015 WL 5257013, at 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), 
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On April 14, 2010, in Achmea v. Slovak Republic, a case governed by 
the UNCITRAL Rules, the respondent state “proposed that the [EC] be 
invited to participate in the Intra-EU Jurisdictional phase of the 
arbitration proceedings as amicus curiae.”163 In response to the 
respondent’s proposal, the tribunal considered requesting commentary 
from the EC and the government of the Netherlands (the home state of 
the investor), specifically on the issue of jurisdiction.164 After discussions 
with both parties, the tribunal contacted the Director General of the Legal 
Service of the EC with an invitation to submit any further 
observations.165 The EC accepted the tribunal’s invitation to participate 
and outlined its views on the Intra-EU jurisdictional objection.166 The 
parties were then given the chance to submit comments on the 
observations provided by Netherlands and the EC.167 Even though the 
original impulse came from a request by the respondent state, the 
Achmea tribunal was “the first investment tribunal to request amici 
curiae submission propio motu [and] also the first to receive such a 
submission from a State.”168 While
the Tribunal did not elaborate on the legal basis of such a request . . . it 
is . . . plausible to treat this conduct as an exercise of inherent powers to 
request information from persons and entities that may be necessary or 
conducive to a fair and accurate settlement of disputes.169
On September 6, 2011, another tribunal operating under the 
UNCITRAL Rules invited Austria, the Czech Republic, and the EC to 
appeal filed, No. 15-3109 (2d Cir. 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7096.pdf.
 163. Achmea v. Slovak, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, 
Arbitrability and Suspension, ¶¶ 26, 151 (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/ita0309.pdf. 
 164. Id. ¶ 30. 
 165. Id. ¶ 31. 
 166. Id. ¶¶ 37, 175–96. 
 167. Id. ¶ 41. 
 168. Bastin, supra note 90, at 130. 
 169. Paparinskis, supra note 109, at 33. 
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file amicus curiae briefs in European American Investment Bank v. 
Slovak Republic.170 Initially, 
the Claimant . . . submitted a request to the Tribunal to invite . . . 
Austria to submit an amicus curiae brief, indicating its agreement that, 
if . . . Austria were invited to intervene as amicus curiae, the EU 
Commission be invited to do the same if the Respondent requested it or 
if the Tribunal wished to extend such an invitation.171
In the end, Austria, the Czech Republic, and the EC were all invited to 
file amicus curiae submissions,172 with the parties to the arbitration being 
given the opportunity to provide commentary on the submissions.173
On March 18, 2014 the EC decided to request leave to intervene as a 
non-disputing party in U.S. Steel v. Slovak Republic.174 However, the 
proceedings were terminated a few months later.175 In May 2014, the EC 
submitted a request for amicus curiae participation in the annulment 
proceedings in Iberdrola v. Guatemala.176 After listening to the parties’ 
observations, the tribunal, operating under the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 
decided to reject the application.177 Later that year, the EC filed an 
application to participate as amicus curiae in Charanne v. Spain.178 “The 
Arbitral Tribunal informed the Parties of the application and invited them 
to submit their comments on the [EC]’s application.”179 After receiving 
 170. European American Inv. Bank v. Slovak, PCA Case No. 2010-17, Award on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 25 (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4226.pdf.
 171. Id. ¶ 18. 
 172. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. 
 173. Id. ¶¶ 26–29. 
 174. See European Commission Decision C(2014) 1676 final, On Action as a 
Non-Disputing Party in the Case U.S. Steel Global Holdings I B.V. (The Netherlands) v. 
Slovak Republic (Mar. 18, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/ 
3/2014/EN/3-2014-1676-EN-F1-1.PDF [hereinafter European Commission Decision]. 
 175. See U.S. Steel v. Slovak, Procedural Order no. 6, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3237.pdf. 
 176. Iberdrola v. Guat., Caso CIADI No. ARB/09/5, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 25 
(Jan. 13, 2015), https://arbitrationlaw.com/sites/default/files/free_pdfs/2015-01-13_-
_decision_on_annulment_sp.pdf. 
 177. Id.
 178. Charanne v. Spain, Final Award 062/2012, ¶ 49 (Arb. Ct. of Madrid 2016), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7162.pdf. 
 179. Id.
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comments from the parties, the tribunal allowed the EC “to submit an 
amicus curiae brief, but denied [it] access to the case file and 
participation in the hearings.”180 In both Antin v. Spain181 and Eiser v. 
Spain,182 the EC is reported to have requested authorization to participate 
in the proceedings. The two arbitral tribunals refused the requests, 
however, stating that the presentation of amicus curiae submissions were 
“premature” at that time.183
This set of cases is just part of the embryonic jurisprudence on 
participation of the EC in investor-state proceedings. While this topic is 
evolving, it is already possible to analyze the main features of this 
phenomenon and identify the main challenges that it poses to arbitral 
tribunals. Such is the goal of the following section. 
III. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AS A DISTINCTIVE AMICUS
A. The Guardian of European Law 
A person or entity that is not a disputing party has legitimacy to apply 
for amicus curiae status it if has a noteworthy interest in the arbitral 
proceedings.184 The ICSID Arbitration Rules provide that “the Tribunal 
shall consider, among other things, the extent to which . . . the non-
disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding.”185 Third–
party participation in investment arbitration therefore depends upon the 
existence of a relevant interest in the dispute, making it necessary to 
enquire about the interests pursued by potential amici. The concept is 
normally said to encompass in broad terms any individual or 
organization that does not have a direct interest in a dispute, and is not 
acting in a shareholding capacity, but wishes to represent people or 
 180. Id. ¶¶ 51, 56. 
 181. ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31. 
 182. ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36. 
 183. Joseph M Tirado, Renewable Energy Claims under the Energy Charter 
Treaty: An Overview, 13(3) OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE 1, 17–18 (2015). 
 184. See supra Section I. 
 185. ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, supra note 19, Rule 37(2). 
264 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.2
groups who cannot advocate for themselves and might be affected by the 
decision of an arbitral tribunal.186
It is evident that the EC pursues interests of a different nature than 
those of traditional participants, such as NGOs and civil society groups. 
Since the European Union is not a signatory to the ICSID Convention, it 
cannot participate in ICSID arbitral proceedings as a party, namely, as a 
respondent to claims filed by foreign investors.187 However, when such 
claims also raise matters of European law, in particular where the 
defendant is a European member state and the impugned state measure 
was done in compliance with or in order to execute European Union law, 
the dispute becomes a matter of interest for the European Union. In such 
cases, the only procedural mechanism that European institutions have to 
make their opinion heard by the arbitral tribunals is to request 
authorization for leave to intervene as an amicus curiae.188
Like any prospective amicus, however, the EC needs to demonstrate a 
significant interest in the proceedings. The nature of the interests pursued 
by the EC relates to its three key functions: “motor of integration, 
guardian of the treaties, and executive body of the EU.”189 The EC has 
legislative and executive functions, namely as regards the 
implementation of policies and European laws. The EC has a legal 
guardianship function that closes relates to and overlaps with its 
executive tasks—ensuring that the European Union’s treaties and 
legislation are respected.190 The legal guardian role requires the EC to act 
as a watchdog, doing what it can to ensure—together with the Court of 
Justice—that European Law is applied and respected throughout the 
Union.191 Therefore, the interest pursued by the EC in investment 
 186. Mary B. Ayad, The Quest for the Holy Grail of Social Justice: Substantive 
and Procedural Law Provisions for Amicus Curiae in Investor-State ICSID Arbitration 
Law and Practice, 9 MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 17, 25 (2012). 
 187. Frank Hoffmeister, The European Union and the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes, 11 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77, 83 (2012). 
 188. Id.
 189. GERHARD SABATHIL ET AL., THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: AN ESSENTIAL 
GUIDE TO THE INSTITUTION, THE PROCEDURES AND THE POLITICS 5–6 (2008). 
 190. MICHELLE CINI, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION 
AND CULTURE IN THE EU ADMINISTRATION 14 (1996); NEILL NUGENT & MARK RHINARD,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 16–17 (2d ed. 2015). 
 191. NUGENT & RHINARD, supra note 190; see also STINE ANDERSEN, THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF EU LAW: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012).
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arbitrations relates to the clarification of issues concerning the scope and 
content of European laws that are connected to the dispute. 
The EC’s participation in investment arbitration is a striking example 
of amicus curiae representing a “direct legal interest” in the outcome of 
the dispute, as opposed to a broad public interest mandate.192 The interest 
pursued by the EC is the correct and uniform application of European 
Law. While the European Union cannot make use of any specific 
procedural mechanism, it should not be seen as mere third party in 
investment arbitration proceedings that involve European member states 
and the application of European law.193 It is clear that the European 
Union has a “direct legal interest in the outcome of the dispute.”194
The nature of the EC’s interest in [such cases is] broader and more 
substantial than ensuring that the tribunal was aware of, say, 
environmental or cultural implications of the project at issue. The EC 
[seeks] to assert the relevance of its legally prescribed regulatory 
mandate, which is replete with policy implications for the entire 
European Union, and to address the consequences of a conflict between 
that mandate and the tribunal’s jurisdiction.195
The role played by the EC in investment arbitration is similar to that 
of “public prosecutor” regularly played by the EC in competition law 
matters, where the EC frequently intervenes as amicus curiae in arbitral 
proceedings.196 Being the “Guardian of the Treaties,” the EC is interested 
in taking part in such proceedings and helping the tribunal to elucidate 
potential conflicts of legal rules and principles.197 The amicus curiae 
mechanism is a useful tool for the EC, not only to offer its views on how 
 192. Triantafilou, supra note 92; Levine, supra note 92, at 215. 
 193. Carlos Gonázlez-Bueno & Laura Lozano, More than a Friend of the Court: 
The Evolving Role of the European Commission in Investor–State Arbitration, KLUWER 
ARB. BLOG (Jan. 26 2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/01/26/more-than-a-
friend-of-the-court-the-evolving-role-of-the-european-commission-in-investor-state-
arbitration; Vadi supra note 139, at 1339. 
 194. Gonzalez-Bueno & Lozano, supra note 193; Vadi, supra note 139, at 1339–
40.
 195. Triantafilou, supra note 92. 
 196. GORDON BLANKE, THE USE AND UTILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN 
EC COMMISSION MERGER REMEDIES: A NOVEL SUPERNATURAL PARADIGM IN THE 
MAKING? 155 (2006). 
 197. Knahr, supra note 123, at 320. 
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European Union laws should be interpreted, but also “to raise awareness 
on the existing interactions between [different] international legal 
subsystems.”198
The investor-state dispute settlement system is designed to determine 
the rights and obligations arising under international investment treaties. 
Disputes which touch upon European Union laws and policies are 
thereby put in the hands of arbitrators, who may not feel compelled to 
give due consideration to those Union interests. It is therefore 
understandable that the EC wants to be heard as amicus curiae.199 “Where 
[European Union] law is at issue in cases brought against EU Member 
States, the [EC] is likely to intervene to protect the EU interest in the 
proper interpretation and application of European law.”200
In the abovementioned cases, three situations of potential conflict 
between European and International Law were under discussion. First, 
there may be an issue of jurisdiction.201 In Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary,
the EC challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Energy Charter 
Treaty, claiming that a “[t]ribunal established under the ICSID 
Convention, ha[d] no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s [Power Purchase 
Agreement] termination claim,”202 and that such a claim should have 
been brought before the Community courts.203 The tribunal’s jurisdiction 
was disputed by the EC, but not by the parties.204 In the annulment 
 198. Francisco J. Pascual Vives, Shaping the EU Investment Regime: Choice of 
Forum and Applicable Law in International Investment Agreements, 6 CUADERNOS DE 
DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 269, 272 (2014). 
 199. Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 82, at 220. 
 200. Hoffmeister, supra note 187, at 104. 
 201. See, e.g., Steffen Hindelang, Circumventing Primacy of EU Law and the 
CJEU’s Judicial Monopoly by Resorting to Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Provided for 
in Inter-se Treaties?, 39 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 179 (2012); Konstanze von 
Papp, Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State Courts Bridge the 
Jurisdictional Divide between Investment Tribunals and the ECJ?, 50 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 1039 (2013); Anna Stier, The Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal in Intra-EU 
Investment Treaty Disputes after the Decision in Electrabel v Hungary, 31 ARB. INT’L
163 (2015). 
 202. Electrabel v. Hung. (Belg. v. Hung.), ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶¶ 4.101, 5.9 (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1071clean.pdf. 
 203. Id. ¶ 5.10. 
 204. Id. ¶¶ 4.89-.90, .92. 
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proceedings in Micula v. Romania, the EC also argued that the tribunal 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.205
In Achmea v. Slovak Republic, the EC argued that, 
in the [European] judicial system, the Luxembourg courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction (i) to determine, in infringement proceedings, 
whether EU Member states have fulfilled their [legal] obligations, and 
(ii) to give preliminary rulings on questions of [European Union] law as 
requested by EU domestic courts and tribunals.206
“As a consequence, [European Union] member states that resort to 
[an] inter-State arbitration mechanism provided for under an intra-EU 
BIT for matters partially covered by [European Union] law, are in breach 
of Article 344 of the TFEU.”207 The EC also “considers [that] there is 
serious potential for discrimination between [] investors from different 
Member States, which is incompatible with [European Union] law.”208
This might happen when  
some investors are covered by a BIT and granted the opportunity to 
resort to investor-State arbitration while others are not. . . . [T]he 
availability of a choice of dispute resolution procedures [for] some 
investors [is seen as an] advantage over investors from other Member 
States, and thus constitutes forbidden discrimination against those other 
[European Union] nationals.209
The EC argued that if the arbitral tribunal rendered an award in this 
case, it risked coming to a conclusion that would be at odds with the 
views of the Commission, or even the European Court of Justice.210 In 
addition, there is the risk that the arbitral award may be incompatible 
with European Union law, and thus unenforceable.211 In the Achmea case 
the EC suggested that the tribunal suspended the arbitration until the EC 
 205. Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 
329–30.
 206. Achmea v. Slovak, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, 
Arbitrability and Suspension, ¶ 178. 
 207. Id.
 208. Id. ¶ 183. 
 209. Id.
 210. Id. ¶ 194. 
 211. Id.
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and/or the European Court of Justice had come to a decision on the 
European Union law aspects of the infringement case.212
In European American Investment Bank v. Slovak Republic, the EC 
also argued that, in the European judicial system, it is for the European 
Union courts to ensure the authentic interpretation of European Union 
law.213 The EC posited that the Court of Justice of the European Union 
has exclusive jurisdiction to review the legality of acts adopted by 
European Union institutions, to determine whether member states have 
fulfilled their obligations under European law in infringement 
proceedings brought by the EC against them, and to give preliminary 
rulings on questions of European Union law as requested by European 
domestic courts and tribunals.214
In Charanne v. Spain, a dispute under the Energy Charter Treaty, 
Spain argued  
that the submission of the dispute to the [Energy Charter Treaty] rather 
than to the dispute resolution mechanisms of the [European Union] 
would constitute a violation of public policy under Spanish law, and 
[that] if the arbitral tribunal render[ed] an award there would be a risk 
of unenforceability or annulment of such award.215
The second instance of potential conflict between European and 
International Law is of a substantial nature. In some cases the national 
measures challenged by the investor, which purportedly violate the 
international obligations protected under investment treaties (i.e., the 
Energy Charter Treaty or Bilateral Investment Treaties), have been 
adopted in order to comply with the host state’s obligations within the 
European integration process. In Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, for 
instance, the EC supported the respondent state’s position, arguing that 
the state aid was illegal and the country did not violate its contractual 
 212. Achmea v. Slovak, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, 
Arbitrability and Suspension, ¶ 196. 
 213. PCA Case No. 2010-17, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 119, 253. 
 214. European American Inv. Bank v. Slovak, PCA Case No. 2010-17, Award on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 242, n. 259. 
 215. Charanne v. Spain, Final Award 062/2012, ¶ 49 (Arb. Ct. of Madrid 2016). 
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obligations, because policy changes were introduced to conform to 
European Union legislation.216 According to this perspective,  
[European Union] member states are obliged . . . to carry out State aid 
decisions issued by the [EC]. If the Tribunal were . . . to make an 
arbitration award that was contrary to obligations legally binding on the 
Respondent as an EU Member State, such an award could not be 
implemented by virtue of the supremacy of [European Union] law.217
AES v. Hungary was another dispute under the Energy Charter Treaty 
that concerned the host state’s decision to change the legal regime 
governing the price the government paid for electricity.218 One of 
Hungary’s defenses was that the EC regarded the preferential pricing 
scheme granted in a 2001 settlement of a dispute regarding the fees 
payable under a Power Purchase Agreement to be state aid incompatible 
with European Union competition laws, and that Hungary had changed 
its pricing mechanism in response to concerns expressed by the EC.219
In Micula v. Romania, a group of foreign investors initiated a claim 
under the Sweden-Romania BIT alleging that Romania had withdrawn a 
number of incentives in breach of the BIT.220 The EC intervened as 
amicus curiae to support Romania’s defense, arguing that the 
interpretation of the BIT should take into account the European Union’s 
state aid rules and that “any payment of compensation arising out of [the] 
Award would constitute illegal state aid under [European Union] law and 
render the award unenforceable within the EU.”221 In its submission in 
the annulment proceedings, the EC argued, inter alia, that the award had 
to be annulled because “the Tribunal failed to apply the applicable law . . 
. [and] to address the question of enforceability of the Award.”222
In Achmea v. Slovak Republic the EC put forward a fundamental 
distinction between ‘extra-European Union BITs’ and ‘intra-European 
Union BITs’, expressing concern about “the compatibility of such BITs 
 216. Electrabel v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 4.110. 
 217. Id. ¶ 5.16. 
 218. AES v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 4. 
 219. Id. ¶ 10.3.15. 
 220. Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, ¶ 1. 
 221. Id. ¶¶ 313, 316–17, 330, 334–35. 
 222. Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 308. 
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with mandatory provisions of [European] law and with the [European] 
judicial system.”223 From the EC’s perspective, “[i]ntra-[European 
Union] BITs amount to an ‘anomaly within the EU internal market.’”224
They create the risk of “a partial overlap between intra-[European Union] 
BITs and the internal market provisions of the [European Union] . . . 
call[ing] into question the permissibility of the continued existence of 
intra-[European Union] BITs.”225 The EC stressed  
that where there is a conflict with [European Union] law, the rule of 
pacta sunt servanda does not apply to agreements between [] Member 
States, because of the . . . supremacy [of European Union Law] not 
only over national legal systems, but also over bilateral agreements 
concluded between Member States.226
The tribunal declared that it could apply European Union Law in the 
merits phase, if necessary.227 This is a noteworthy decision, as it is 
improbable that the tribunal would make such a finding if the EC had not 
raised the question in its submission.228
Similarly, in European American Investment Bank v. Slovak Republic,
the EC argued where the dispute touches upon questions of application 
and interpretation of law covered by European Treaties, European Union 
Law prevails.229 In cases of conflict with European Union Law, the 
general international law rule of pacta sunt servanda could not be 
applied to treaties concluded between member states.230 The EC was also 
poised to make the same argument in U.S. Steel v. Slovak Republic when 
the proceedings were terminated.231
 223. PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 
¶¶ 176–77. 
 224. Id. ¶ 177. 
 225. Id.
 226. Id. ¶ 180. 
 227. Vives, supra note 198, at 286. 
 228. Id.
 229. Letter from the Director General of the European Commission Legal Service 
to Legal Counsel at the Permanent Court of Arbitration 2 (Sept. 6, 2011), 
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In the different proceedings against the Czech Republic the EC is also 
reported to have raised a conflict with the provisions of European Union 
Law.232 According to the EC, “former benefits and incentives accorded to 
solar investors could constitute . . . state aid that needed to be eliminated 
in order for the Czech Republic to remain in compliance with [European 
Union] law.”233
Finally, some cases specifically raise the issue of the relationship 
between the Energy Charter Treaty and European Union Law.234 The 
European Union is, alongside its member states, a party to the treaty.235
Indeed, the European Union has signed the Energy Charter Treaty as a 
Regional Economic Integration Organization.236 It is apparent from the 
statement made by the EC at the conclusion of the Energy Charter Treaty 
that the EC can become a party to an investment arbitration proceeding if 
 232. Vadi, supra note 139, at 1340–41. 
 233. Id. (quoting Luke E. Peterson, Brussels’ Latest Intervention Casts Shadow 
Over Investment Treaty Arbitrations Brought by Jilted Solar Energy Investors, INV. ARB.
REP. (Sept, 8, 2014), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/brussels-latest-intervention-
casts-shadow-over-investment-treaty-arbitrations-brought-by-jilted-solar-energy-
investors).
 234. See, e.g., Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, The Energy Community, the 
Energy Charter Treaty and the Promotion of EU Energy Security, in THE ENERGY 
COMMUNITY: A NEW ENERGY GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 551 (Dirk Buschle & Kim Talus 
eds., 2015); Ernesto Bonafé & Gökçe Mete, Escalated Interactions Between EU Energy 
Law and the Energy Charter Treaty, 0 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 1 (2016); Graham 
Coop, Energy Charter Treaty and the European Union: Is Conflict Inevitable?, 27 J.
ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 404 (2009); János Katona, The Role of EU Law in ‘Intra 
EU’ ISDS Under the ECT: Some Thoughts on the Electrabel v. Hungary Award, 1 ELTE
L.J. 57 (2015); Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Investment Protection and EU Law: The Intra- and 
Extra-EU Dimension of the Energy Charter Treaty, 15 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 85 (2012); 
Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, The Energy Community and the Energy Charter 
Treaty: Special Legal Regimes, Their Systemic Relationship to the EU, and Their Dispute 
Settlement Arrangements, 12 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE 1 (2014). 
 235. Constituency of the Energy Charter Conference, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER,
http://www.energycharter.org/who-we-are/members-observers/ (last accessed March 23, 
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that proceeding pertains to issues for which it bears competence.237 In 
Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, the EC, in its written submission, stated 
“that, whilst the Tribunal had invited it to express views as an expert 
commentator on European Community law, the [EC] was presenting its 
Submission as the external representative of the European Communities 
as a Contracting Party to the Energy Charter Treaty.”238 This competence 
has also been an important element for the EC to request a leave to 
intervene as a non-disputing party in AES v. Hungary.239 “The fact that 
the status of the EC as an [Regional Economic Integration Organization] 
has been explicitly recognized by the [Energy Charter Treaty] is an 
additional element not usually present in arbitrations based on a BIT.”240
The Energy Charter Treaty and European and national legislation 
each establish different regulatory layers governing energy markets. 
Although those layers are in principle complementary, different rules 
may cause inconsistencies.241 The EC has long maintained the position 
that the Energy Charter Treaty does not apply to intra-European Union 
disputes. In Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, the EC submitted that European 
Union law prevailed over the Energy Charter Treaty.242 In Charanne v. 
Spain, Spain argued that  
intra-European investment relations are subject to the specific 
regulatory framework of the [European Union], which thoroughly deals 
with all matters governed by investment treaties, including those 
covered by the [Energy Charter Treaty]. Therefore, the [Charter] is not 
applicable to investments made within the [European Union] by 
nationals of EU Member States.243
 237. Council and Commission Decision (EC) No. 98/181 of 23 Sept. 1997, art. 2, 
1998 O.J. (L 69/1) 1, 2. 
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 239. AES v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 8.2. 
 240. Hoffmeister, supra note 187, at 92. 
 241. Bonafé & Mete, supra note 234, at 3. 
 242. Electrabel v. Hung. (Belg. v. Hung.), ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 4.109. 
 243. Charanne v. Spain, Final Award 062/2012, ¶ 208 (Arb. Ct. of Madrid 2016). 
2017] A Guardian and a Friend? 273
In the post-hearing phase, Spain argued once again that the Energy 
Charter Treaty contains a sort of ‘implicit disconnection clause’ 
concerning intra-European Union BITs.244
Thus far the EC has been allowed to intervene in several investment 
arbitrations as amicus curiae. This enabled to EC to inform the arbitral 
tribunal about the contents and scope of the European Union Law 
provisions related to those disputes. The intervention of the EC in the 
proceedings may, naturally, raise the technical complexity of the 
proceedings due to the possible collision between the provisions of 
investment treaties and of European Union laws.245 “The evolving role of 
the [EC] in energy-related investor-state arbitrations” has been said to be 
part of a larger series of ongoing “thematic dialogues” . . . between 
public international law and European Union [] Law. Whether 
[European Union] law is just a component of public international law . . 
. or whether it constitutes an autonomous legal order . . . remains a 
debated issue.246
The relationship between bilateral investment treaties and European 
Union law is extremely complex, having been the subject of a copious 
amount of literature.247 The cases discussed above illustrate how the 
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increasing interaction between international investment law and 
European Union law raises complex and unresolved legal issues. 
These arbitrations . . . raise the important question, among many others, 
of how [European Union] law has to be taken into account when 
interpreting the rights and obligations flowing from [international 
investment] agreements. It is therefore very useful that the [European 
Union], represented by the [EC], was granted leave to intervene in 
[most of these] cases.248
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Pursuant to the ICSID Arbitration Rules, amici curiae are expected to 
“assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related 
to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or 
insight that is different from that of the disputing parties.”249 In the cases 
under discussion, the EC played an especially useful role not only by 
clarifying the scope and contents of European Union Law, but also by 
ensuring that the tribunal’s interpretation of the relevant investment 
treaty was in accordance with respondent state’s obligations under 
European Union law.250 According to Schill, investment tribunals should 
adopt a comparative law approach encompassing both domestic and 
international public law, 251 with the latter being defined to include 
human rights, trade law, and European Union law. The participation of 
the EC may be useful to achieve a holistic interpretation and application 
of international law, especially taking into account that, pursuant to 
Article 3(5) of the Treaty on the European Union, the European Union 
shall contribute to “the strict observance and the development of 
international law.”252
In the amicus curiae brief submitted to the United States Court of 
Appeals in the aftermath of Micula v. Romania, the EC claimed that its 
“sovereign interest is to ensure that the U.S. courts, in accordance with 
the settled rules of international comity, avoid unnecessary interference 
with the enforcement and efficacy of the E.U. legal order.”253 The EC 
presented itself as the “guardian” of the European Union treaties, and 
claimed to have a “compelling interest” in the appeal,254 namely, that it 
had a “strong interest in ensuring that the propriety of its decisions be 
reviewed by the European Union’s highest court, and that other 
countries’ courts defer to these proceedings in the interests of comity.”255
The EC added:  
 249. ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, supra note 19, Rule 37(2)(a). 
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As the “guardian” of the E.U. Treaties, and as an active participant in a 
variety of legal proceedings concerning the legality of the Award under 
E.U. law, the Commission is well placed to offer a unique perspective 
on the important implications of E.U. law and international comity to 
this appeal. The Commission has previously filed amici briefs before 
the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court where the European Union’s 
vital interests were implicated, as they are in this case.256
The EC wishes to intervene in proceedings in order to make sure that 
European Union Law is enforced, but also to present its views on how 
possible conflicts between the rules and principles of European Law and 
those of international investment law should be solved. Investment 
tribunals seem to acknowledge the special interest pursued by the EC. In 
Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary the tribunal noted that the EC “is an expert 
commentator on European [Union] law and could accordingly assist the 
Tribunal by addressing several legal issues.”257 In the opinion of the 
tribunal, the EC had “much more than ‘a significant interest’” in the case, 
which was distinct from the positions of the parties.258 However, the 
tribunal also noted that  
the scope of [the EC’s] legal opinion should in principle be directed to 
addressing the following issues: (a) European Community Law and its 
connection with the Energy Charter Treaty; (b) Community Law and 
the State Aid investigation concerning the Power Purchase Agreements 
signed by Hungary; and (c) the Effect of Community Decisions on the 
European Union’s Members States, particularly Hungary. As to purely 
factual questions, the Tribunal notes that, in principle, the European 
Commission is unlikely to assist the tribunal.259
The Tribunal in Micula v. Romania stated that it was “particularly 
sensitive to the fact that the European Community may bring a factual or 
legal perspective that could assist the Tribunal in the adjudication of the 
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Parties’ rights,”260 “specifying that the purpose of such participation 
would be to assist the Tribunal in its adjudicatory work.”261 The tribunal 
also specified that the 
[EC]’s written submission shall not respond or comment upon the 
Parties’ prayers for relief, but shall be focused on assisting the Tribunal 
in the determination of factual or legal issues at stake in the present 
dispute. It is expected that the scope of the Community’s input will be 
limited to facts within its own knowledge and to European law rather 
than to any other facts or legal matters at issue in this arbitration. The 
Community may within this scope decide which facts and laws are 
relevant to the dispute.262
On its request to intervene as a non-disputing party in the annulment 
proceedings that ensued, the EC argued that it was able to do so under 
Rules 37(2) and 53 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules (2006).263
The EC also stated that Article 23(a)(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 659/1999 [of March 22, 1999,264] which is applicable to all EU 
Member States, supports its claim that it has a significant interest in 
arbitration proceedings in which [European Union] state aid rules may 
be discussed. As a guardian of the treaties relating to investment 
protection within the [European Union], and as it has a central role in 
the interpretation and application of the rules on State aid under the 
[Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union], the EC claimed 
that it had a particular interest in the annulment proceedings and could 
assist the Committee in the determination of a factual or legal issue 
related to the proceeding by bringing perspective, particular knowledge 
and/or insight that differs from that of the disputing parties. In addition, 
the EC noted that it had been allowed to participate as a non-disputing 
Party in the Original Proceeding.265
The investors
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contended that the Committee did not have the power to allow the EC 
to intervene in the proceedings under the applicable 2003 Arbitration 
Rules, as these do not provide for non-disputing party participation. 
Furthermore, according to the Claimants, there ha[d] never been a 
successful application for intervention by a non-disputing party in an 
annulment proceeding.266
The claimants quoted the case Iberdrola v. Guatemala, where
the committee had rejected a similar application because of the “narrow 
nature of annulment proceedings.” The Claimants argued that, in any 
event, the Application must be denied because it [did] not meet the 
requirements. The circumstances in the annulment proceeding [were] 
very different from those in the Original Proceeding in which the 
Tribunal allowed the EC to participate . . . the EC [could not] re-argue 
issues which [had] already been decided by the Tribunal and which 
[were] irrelevant for the purposes of the annulment.267
From the claimants’ perspective, the EC did not “have a significant 
interest in the proceeding and [could not] provide the Committee with 
the relevant expertise relating to Article 52(1) of the ICSID 
Convention.”268
Romania argued that the EC’s Application [met] the requirements 
established by the jurisprudence at the time of the application of the 
2003 Rules . . . [and] that the Committee would be assisted by the EC’s 
expertise on [European Union] State aid rules and the interaction 
between [European Union] law and public international law, which 
[were] matters of the public interest since they impact other [] Member 
States.269
Ultimately, the committee allowed the EC to participate in the 
annulment proceedings as a non-disputing party.270 It noted, however,  
 266. Id. ¶ 56. 
 267. Id. ¶ 56-57. 
 268. Id.
 269. Id. ¶ 60. 
 270. Id. ¶ 61. 
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that due to the limited scope of annulment proceedings, a request for 
leave by a non-disputing party must be dealt with in a more restrictive 
and circumscribed manner. However, as long as that limited scope is 
fully observed, a non-disputing party may be allowed to file an amicus 
curiae submission limited to matters directly related to the grounds for 
annulment. The Committee accepted the EC’s position that it had an 
interest in acting as a non-disputing Party and found that the EC had 
satisfactorily established that it had the “expertise, experience and 
independence to be of assistance” in the annulment proceeding. It also 
found that an intervention by the EC would not be prejudicial to the 
Parties or prolong the proceedings, as long as its submission adhered to 
certain conditions.271
With the exceptions of Iberdrola v. Guatemala,272 Antin v. Spain,273
and Eiser v. Spain,274 arbitral tribunals have recognized that the EC has a 
significant interest in participating in investor-state proceedings where 
matters of European Union law are potentially implicated. The EC may 
assist the tribunal in the determination of a legal issue related to the 
proceedings, namely, elucidating the potential application of European 
Union Law to the dispute. The nature of the interest pursued by the EC in 
investment proceedings is, therefore, significantly different from that of 
traditional amici such as NGOs and civil society organizations. The EC 
is not acting as an advocate for social concerns, but rather as the guardian 
of European Union laws. Its main goal is not to promote the transparency 
or openness of the proceedings to civil society, but instead to assist the 
tribunal in reaching to a correct decision. 
B. A Political Friend? 
Opening up investor-state arbitration to the participation of non-
disputing parties significantly alters the philosophy that traditionally 
inspired this dispute settlement mechanism and the structure on which it 
is sustained. Such a weighty process of reform raises diverse concerns, 
namely as regards its impact on investment arbitration as an orderly and 
efficient system for the settlement of disputes between foreign investors 
 271. Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 63. 
 272. Caso CIADI No. ARB/09/5. 
 273. ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31. 
 274. ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36. 
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and host states. Scholars and practitioners have expressed apprehension 
about several possible negative effects of amicus curiae participation in 
investment arbitration. The benefits brought about by the introduction of 
mechanisms for third-party participation need to be weighted against its 
potential disadvantages. 
A concern expressed frequently is that the participation of outsiders in 
the proceedings may affect the equality of arms between the positions of 
the claimant and respondent. Amici tend to support only one of the 
disputing parties.275 This may force the other side to respond to a 
disproportionate number of opposing submissions,276 thus devoting more 
effort and expense into its representation.277 Normally amici support the 
respondent state’s position in their submissions,278 even though in some 
cases they also intervene to support the claimant.279 The participation of 
non-disputing parties may increase the burden on claimants substantially, 
as they have to review the amicus briefs and attempt to rebut them. As 
they stand to benefit from amicus intervention, host states may feel 
tempted to use amici as a tool to put pressure on the investor.280
Amicus curiae intervention may disturb the parties’ carefully designed 
procedural strategies. Parties are sometimes unwilling to reveal all the 
information related to the dispute because they may be subject to 
political pressure, or they might believe that the disclosure will be 
 275. Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration,
113(4) PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1293 (2009). 
 276. Charles N. Brower, The Ethics of Arbitration: Perspectives from a Practicing 
International Arbitrator, 5 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 1, 29 (2010). 
 277. Epaminontas E. Triantafilou, Is a Connection to the “Public Interest” a 
Meaningful Prerequisite of Third Party Participation in Investment Arbitration? 5 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 38, 43 (2010). 
 278. Noah Rubins, Opening the Investment Arbitration Process: At What Cost, for 
What Benefit?, in 3 THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID): TAKING STOCK AFTER 40 YEARS 213, 216 (Rainer 
Hofmann & Christian Tams eds., 2007); Magraw Jr. & Amerasinghe, supra note 43, at 
355; Thomas W. Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration Under the 
Shadow of the Dual Role of the State: Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, Pro-
actively, the Equality of Arms, 26(1) ARB. INT’L 3, 33 (2010). 
 279. Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party Participation in Investment-Environment 
Disputes: Recent Developments, 16(2) REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 230, 240 
(2007).
 280. Wälde, supra note 278, at 33–34. 
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against their best interests.281 “Amicus briefs, therefore, can negatively 
affect the parties’ degree of autonomy and control over their 
arbitration.”282 In investment treaty arbitration, as international 
commercial arbitration, tribunals rely primarily on the arguments of the 
parties.283 The acceptance of amicus curiae submissions introduces a 
change to this structure. As an independent third party, an amicus will, 
and is supposed to, make arguments from its own perspective. Indeed, in 
the WTO context, it is argued that “for many private actors seeking to 
participate in a WTO dispute, the primary purpose is to present factual 
information or express an argument left ignored by governments.”284 If 
such arguments of amici affect the tribunals’ decision on substantive 
issues, it may surprise the disputing parties. “Such a consequence not 
only is an interference with the parties’ strategy to win, but also brings a 
substantial change to the arbitration system designed by the parties.”285
In extreme situations, the opening up of proceedings to outsiders may 
even harden the parties’ positions, exacerbating disputes and making the 
peaceful settlement of disputes more difficult.286 This may result in the 
case being decided also by the “court” of public opinion, re-politicizing 
the dispute and thus “undermin[ing] one of the main policy objectives 
behind investor-state arbitration, namely the de-politicization of 
[investment] disputes.”287 Turning a legal dispute into a political quarrel 
disturbs the normality of proceedings, reduces the chances of settlement 
between parties, and may even reduce investor confidence in the system, 
having a chilling effect on foreign investment.288
The exact role that amici curiae should play, and whether it should be 
characterized by impartiality, is a controversial issue. It is axiomatic that 
amici should have an interest in the dispute—but should they be 
 281. Ishikawa, supra note 110, at 393. 
 282. Gómez, supra note 73, at 550–51. 
 283. LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 310 (2d ed. 2010). 
 284. James Durling & David Hardin, Amicus Curiae Participation in WTO 
Dispute Settlement: Reflections on the Past Decade, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 229 (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005). 
 285. Ishikawa, supra note 110, at 393. 
 286. Rubins, supra note 278, at 218. 
 287. Triantafilou, supra note 277; Bastin, supra note 90, at 140-41; see Ibrahim 
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independent from the dispute? Should they only be a friend of the 
tribunal, or can they also be a friend of one of the parties? According to 
the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, amici can be a 
disinterested source or a partisan one.289 Taking into account that most 
amici are NGOs and special interest groups, it is unrealistic to expect that 
they will not openly endorse the position of one of the parties.290 While 
amici are not expected to be indifferent to the dispute, or even take the 
side of one of the parties, they should not be the duplicate of a party, or 
directly connected to it.291 If clearly biased and partisan entities are 
authorized to take part in arbitral proceedings, this opens the door to the 
re-politicization of investment disputes, potentially disrupting the arbitral 
proceedings.292
The approach of arbitral tribunals to this question is not uniform. 
NAFTA tribunals appear to have accepted that amici can be biased 
towards one of the parties. The tribunal in Methanex Corp. v. United 
States held that “Amici are not experts; such third persons are advocates 
(in the non-pejorative sense) and not ‘independent’ in that they advance a 
particular case to a tribunal.”293 Arbitral tribunals operating under the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules, however, seem to view amici under a different 
light. In the Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina case, the tribunal defined the role 
of amici in the following terms:  
The traditional role of an amicus curiae in an adversary proceeding is 
to help the decision maker arrive at its decision by providing the 
decision maker with arguments, perspectives, and expertise that the 
litigating parties may not provide. In short, a request to act as amicus 
curiae is an offer of assistance – an offer that the decision maker is free 
to accept or reject. An amicus curiae is a volunteer, a friend of the 
court, not a party.294
 289. UNIDROIT, supra note 2, § 13 cmt. P-13A. 
 290. Blackaby & Richard, supra note 106, at 273. 
 291. Crema, supra note 2, at 114. 
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The same tribunal later held “that the role of an amicus curiae is not 
to challenge arguments or evidence put forward by the Parties. This is 
the Parties’ role.”295 The tribunal in Biwater v. Tanzania stated that 
amicus are 
not expected . . . [to] consider themselves as simply in the same 
position as either party’s lawyers, or . . . see their role as suggesting to 
the Arbitral Tribunal how issues of fact or law as presented by the 
parties ought to be determined (which is the sole mandate of the 
Arbitral Tribunal itself).296
It is clear that amici should not confuse their role with that of 
disputing parties.297 However, it is difficult to determine with rigor the 
precise contours of the role of amicus curiae in investment arbitration. 
Investment treaties and arbitral rules focus on the existence of a relevant 
interest as a necessary condition for third parties to intervene in the 
proceedings, but are silent on whether they should remain strictly 
independent from parties’ positions. On occasion amici may remain 
appropriately independent from the parties’ positions, but still find 
themselves in agreement with one of the parties’ arguments. “An amicus 
curiae should not be expected to be independent in the same way as an 
expert or a witness because . . . [it] has a purported interest in the 
outcome of the dispute.”298 However, it should “be expected to put 
forward [its] point of view in a way which is independent from the 
parties’ procedural strategies.”299
The intervention of a political actor, such as the EC, adds specific 
difficulties to this issue. The EC is the European Union’s politically 
Amicus Curiae, ¶ 13 (May 19, 2005), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0815.pdf. 
 295. Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response 
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 296. Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5, ¶ 64, (Feb. 2, 2007), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0091_0.pdf [hereinafter 
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 299. Id.
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independent executive arm.300 Its participation in the proceedings raises 
questions about the influence that a highly influential political institution 
should exercise on investment tribunals. Knahr rightfully asks: “Is this a 
positive development or does increased participation of potent non-
disputing parties cause more harm to the system of investment arbitration 
than it creates benefits?”301 In this case the third party has a purpose and 
structure that is totally different from a civil society group or NGOs. 
Investors may argue that its intervention creates an imbalance between 
the parties as the non-disputing party might support the arguments of the 
host state, increasing the risk of politicization of the dispute. Especially 
when the EC submits arguments supporting one side’s position over the 
other, tribunals may be wary of any prejudice introduced by amicus 
participation. Arbitral panels may also feel inclined to attach greater 
importance to amicus briefs submitted by an institution that, like the 
responding state, has a political nature. The question is whether political 
influence should be accounted for in an arbitral proceeding, and whether 
this influence creates an additional risk of politicization of investment 
disputes to the detriment of party equality.302
Arbitral tribunals seem to be aware of the need to ensure that the 
intervention of the EC does not disturb the balance between the parties, 
nor the efficiency of the dispute resolution mechanism. In Micula v. 
Romania the tribunal started by stating:  
In granting leave to the European Community to participate as a non-
disputing party, the Arbitral Tribunal is mindful of the need to preserve 
due process and the good order of the proceeding. In particular, the 
European Community shall act as amicus curiae and not as amicus 
actoris vel rei. In other words, the non-disputing party shall remain a 
friend of the court and not a friend of either Party.303
Later, during annulment proceedings, the investors opposed the EC’s 
participation, arguing that it “would cause them unfair prejudice because 
it would prolong the proceedings and enable the EC to pursue a policy 
 300. JOHN MCCORMICK & JONATHAN OLSEN, The EUROPEAN UNION 157 (5th ed. 
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 302. See Id. at 335–36. 
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objective aligned with that of the Applicant, in effect acting as an 
advocate for Romania.”304 “Romania [responded] that tribunals have 
consistently allowed the EC to participate in investment arbitration cases 
and that it [was] not aware of any cases in which the EC was not 
permitted to participate as a non-disputing party due to perceived lack of 
independence in relation to the parties.”305 The annulment committee 
decided to allow the EC to participate in the proceedings.306 Probably 
fearing renewed accusations of lack of independence, in the amicus 
curiae brief submitted to the Second Circuit of the United States Court of 
Appeals the EC stated that “no party or person other than the amicus and 
its counsel made a monetary contribution for the preparation or 
submission of this brief. This brief was not authored, in whole or in part, 
by counsel for a party. All parties have consented to the filing of this 
amicus brief.”307
In Achmea v. Slovak Republic the respondent state complained that 
there had been an ex parte communication between the investor and the 
EC.308 The investor submitted a copy of the communication to the 
respondent and the tribunal, and the Slovak Republic presented its 
reply.309 A few days later, the tribunal rejected a request by the Slovak 
Republic “to allow disclosure of the EC’s observations in [that] 
arbitration to an arbitral tribunal constituted in another arbitration 
involving the Slovak Republic under the same BIT.”310
The EC is presumably willing to co-operate with states to help them 
construct their arguments.311 In disputes arising from BITs between 
member states and third countries, article 13 of Regulation (EU) No. 
 304. Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 58. 
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1219/2012 requires member states to cooperate fully with the EC and 
take all necessary measures to ensure an effective defense which may 
include, where appropriate, the participation in the procedure by the 
EC.312 Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No. 912/2014 requires that the 
member state provide the EC in a timely manner with relevant 
documents relating to the proceeding, inform the EC in a timely manner 
of all significant procedural steps, and permit representatives of the EC, 
at its request and its own expense, to form part of the delegation 
representing the member state.313 The former regulation appears to be 
directed at the participation of the EC in the proceedings as amicus 
curiae, because for now there is no legal ground for another type of 
intervention.314 It is possible that this regime was intended to create a 
right for the EC to participate in the proceedings. At the same time, it 
would not normally be possible for the EU to be a party to the 
proceedings as the arbitration would take place under a member state 
BIT.315 Some commentators therefore note that it could only mean that 
the EC would participate as amicus curiae.316
However, while the EC appears to be interested in having a close 
involvement in most arbitral proceedings, such involvement might not 
always be possible. It is not entirely clear how the abovementioned 
provision should be interpreted or what practical effects they might have. 
“While the [EC] may put pressure on the member states to allow [its] 
intervention, it would appear that little more can be done, and this 
question will have to be decided by tribunals on a case-by-case basis.”317
A further issue relates to the sharing of information in arbitral 
proceedings. Most arbitral rules and investment treaties still establish the 
confidential nature of the arbitral record.318 The fulfillment of the duty of 
cooperation between the member state and the EC would necessarily 
involve the communication of a number of documents and information 
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relating to the arbitration proceedings. Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No. 
1219/2012319 provides that the member states may indicate which 
documents or information are confidential and should not be 
communicated to the other member states.  
However, this single provision on confidentiality does not deal with the 
question of the communication of information to the [EC] itself, as 
where the proceedings are confidential the member state would 
technically be barred from communicating such documents or 
information to the [EC]. It is uncertain what this provision will entail 
for the parties. It is not entirely clear whether it is possible for the 
regulation to allow the [EC] to participate in the arbitration or to be 
kept informed of the proceedings.320
[M]ember states could do little more than to seek the investor’s 
agreement or, where the rules so provide, to support the [EC]’s petition 
to the tribunal to allow the [EC] to submit observations in writing and 
to attend hearings. The latter can be prevented by the investor by 
simply objecting to such a petition; the tribunal then has no powers to 
admit the [EC] under [Rule 32(2) of] the ICSID Rules. The former can 
be granted by the tribunal on a discretionary basis [pursuant to Rule 
37(2)]. . . . [According to Rule 39(1),321 t]he tribunal also has discretion 
as to whether to order the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings, as 
well as of the documents produced therein. . . . A breach of the 
obligation of confidentiality could have serious repercussions for the 
procedural position of the member state.322
In those cases where the EC is allowed to intervene as amicus curiae, 
as illustrated by the Micula case,323 arbitral panels will scrutinize the 
parties’ behavior closely in order to ensure that the amicus does not 
become a friend of one of the parties (namely, the respondent state) 
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instead of a friend of the tribunal. Arbitrators are used to monitoring the 
behavior of disputing parties and enforcing the applicable rules when 
they abuse the rights granted to them. They should do the same regarding 
the EC, making sure that it does not use the amicus curiae mechanism in 
a way which compromises or undermines the procedural integrity and 
legitimacy of investor-state arbitration. 
By granting an opportunity for a political actor to access the dispute 
resolution process, the amici curiae mechanism naturally entails a risk 
that the discussion will become politicized. However, this risk should not 
be over emphasized. First, it exists even if third-parties are not allowed to 
intervene in the proceedings. Some information about the dispute is 
likely to reach the public domain whether investment arbitration is open 
to amici or not,324 potentially causing strong public reactions.325
Moreover, if third parties are prevented from having access to the 
proceedings, the overall community may perceive investor-state 
arbitration as secret and suspicious. The lack of access to the factual and 
legal issues under discussion may ignite debates of a political nature that 
could be avoided or at least mitigated by providing the overall 
community with a clear picture of the contours of the dispute. If the 
public has access to more accurate and balanced information, the 
opportunity for political campaigns against either the respondent state or 
the claimant is reduced.326 Second, the disputing parties are always given 
the possibility to respond to the amicus curiae briefs submitted.327 They 
may draw the attention of the tribunal to situations that have the potential 
to undermine the independence of the amicus or affect the integrity of the 
proceedings. Third, it should be expected that arbitrators will be able to 
identify situations where amici are moving the discussion from the legal 
or factual level to a political dimension, and that they will exercise their 
powers, restraining the discussion to the issues in dispute.328
Bastin argues that the participation of the EC has, thus far, been 
neutral, truly focusing on elucidating a legal issue for the tribunal rather 
than supporting a claimant’s endeavors or a state’s position.329 The EC 
 324. Tienhaara, supra note 279, at 240. 
 325. Ishikawa, supra note 110, at 399. 
 326. Tienhaara, supra note 279, at 240. 
 327. Ishikawa, supra note 110, at 398. 
 328. Magraw Jr. & Amerasinghe, supra note 43, at 355. 
 329. Bastin, supra note 90, at 136. 
2017] A Guardian and a Friend? 289
has been using the amicus curiae mechanism to clarify issues relating to 
European Union law and the interpretation of the applicable investment 
treaty. While the resolution of these issues undoubtedly had 
consequences for the parties in each arbitration, the purpose of the amici 
curiae participation was not to advocate for an interest that they shared 
with one of the parties, but rather only to articulate a legal position.330 As 
more information becomes available on other cases where the EC is 
intervening, it will be possible to have a clearer picture of how arbitral 
tribunals are minimizing the risk of politicization of the dispute and 
ensuring the integrity of the dispute settlement mechanism. 
C. Breadth of Participatory Rights 
When arbitral tribunals decide to allow the intervention of the EC as 
amicus curiae according to the applicable rules (namely, in ICSID 
arbitrations, Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules331), it is necessary 
to determine the range of participatory rights of the EC. Amici curiae 
normally request permission from the tribunal to submit briefs; however, 
sometimes amici also seek authorization to consult the disputing parties’ 
“documents, attend the hearings, make oral submissions, and[] respond 
to questions from the tribunal.”332
In Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary the EC requested that it receive copies 
of the parties’ submission filed to that date in order to properly prepare 
its submission.333 The tribunal noted  
a particular difficulty arises on the issue whether the Parties should be 
ordered to disclose their memorials to the European Commission for 
the purpose of assisting the Commission to prepare its submission to 
the Tribunal. The resolution of this difficulty is not made easier given 
that (as it appears) no tribunal has yet ordered any party to disclose its 
written submission in like circumstances to an amicus, without the 
parties’ consent.334
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Nonetheless, the tribunal stated that it was is mindful that the EC’s 
“significant” interest as an amicus in the proceedings was  
not limited to pure legal questions but may extend to hybrid issues (i.e., 
issues of mixed fact and law) and that, in order properly to address the 
latter, the Commission may need access, in material part, to the 
substance of the Parties’ memorials in this case. The Tribunal is 
concerned that, without such access, the European Commission would 
be restricted to what could be regarded as a pure legal moot of 
academic interest only and thus deprive it of any effective role as an 
amicus in this case under ICSID Arbitration Rule 37(2).335
Taking into account all these factors, the tribunal decided to invite the 
parties to “consider the most appropriate method of providing such 
access to the [EC],” proposing two different methods.336 Eventually the 
parties provided to the EC with redacted versions of the memorial, the 
amended memorial and the counter-memorial for the preparation of the 
EC’s submission.337
In AES v. Hungary the EC also petitioned for access to the parties’ 
written submissions, but it was refused due to lack of consent by both 
parties.338 In Micula v. Romania the EC was granted access to the parties’ 
pleadings, except for confidential or legally privileged documents.339 The 
tribunal also invited the representatives of the EC who had drafted the 
EC’s amicus brief to provide clarifications on that submission at the 
hearing.340 In the annulment proceedings the EC also requested to be 
granted access to documents filed in the annulment proceeding and to 
provide oral testimony at hearings.341 The annulment committee decided 
that
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the EC would not be granted access to the documents filed by the 
Parties in the annulment proceeding; and [that] the EC would not be 
permitted to attend the hearings as the Claimants had opposed such 
attendance. The committee stated that the EC’s role in the annulment 
proceeding was different than in the Original Proceeding, and was 
limited to its knowledge and perspective directly related to the grounds 
for annulment.342
In Achmea v. Slovak Republic the EC requested copies of the 
investor’s claims.343 The Tribunal compromised, providing the EC with 
only the Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim. 344 The Parties 
further provided the EC and the government of the Netherlands with a 
copy of the Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension.345 In 
European American Investment Bank v. Slovak Republic the parties 
agreed to provide excerpts of their written submissions to the amicus 
curiae.346 The tribunal provided the amici curiae with several alternative 
translations of the relevant treaty, in addition to the redacted submissions 
the parties had consented to disclose.347 Finally, in Charanne v. Spain the 
tribunal relied on article 46 of the Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration 
Institute of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce when it denied the EC 
access to the case files and participation in the hearings, due to the 
confidentiality of the arbitration.348
The access by non-disputing parties to arbitration documents and 
hearings is still handled rather restrictively under the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules. While Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Rules empowers tribunals to grant 
third parties amicus curiae status, it does not regulate the access to 
documents.349 As a result, amici’s access to key arbitral documents is 
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normally dependent upon the parties’ consent. Furthermore, the tribunal 
may deny access by arguing that documents are already publicly 
available or are privileged. Even if a tribunal decides to grant access to 
documents, it may still place conditions on the use of that information, 
for instance, banning any public disclosure.350 The access of non-
disputing parties to hearings is also problematic. Rule 32(2) stipulates 
that the tribunal can allow non-parties to attend the arbitration hearings 
unless either party objects.351 Proposals for the inclusion of an expanded 
right of non-disputing parties to attend hearings failed to reach the 
required majority during the discussions that led to the 2006 
amendments.352
As demonstrated, in some cases the EC has been denied access to key 
arbitral documents, namely the parties’ submissions. In some 
proceedings they were also prevented from voicing their opinion in 
hearings. This is consistent with previous practice by ICSID tribunals, 
where the participation rights of third parties remain extremely limited.353
However, some authors question whether such restrictions should be 
applied when the amicus curiae is the EC.354 The participation by the EC 
in investment arbitrations implicates the issue of whether institutional 
rules and tribunals need to expressly take into account the nature, 
significance, and directness of its claimed interest in a dispute when 
deciding upon rights of intervention.355
Since existing restrictions were designed essentially having in mind 
submissions by NGOs, it is debatable whether they should apply to amici 
with a significant, direct, and legally protectable interests in the outcome 
of the dispute.356
The contrast between NGO participation and that of third parties such 
as the [EC] raises a crucial issue regarding the need for investment 
tribunals to recognize that certain third parties may have more 
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significant legal interests in the outcome of the dispute, and as such, 
may merit broader participation rights.357
Since the EC “has a particular mandate to ensure that [European 
Union] law is interpreted consistently in all forums,” it seems justified to 
give “greater weight to its submissions” than those of NGOs in 
investment arbitrations.358 A relaxation of the current restrictions on 
amicus participation in the case of legally interested third parties would 
not only serve better the interests of those parties. “Tribunals may also be 
able to achieve more comprehensive resolutions of the disputes before 
them, with greater likelihood of enforcement of the resulting award.”359
As mentioned previously, one of the strongest arguments in favor of 
third party participation in investment arbitration is that it can help to 
improve the legal quality of the award and to assist in the systemic 
development of international investment law as a whole.360 This is, 
without doubt, the strongest reason to allow the intervention of the EC in 
investment proceedings, in its capacity as an expert in European Union 
Law. The EC presents itself in a role different from that of NGOs, 
according “itself authority on questions of applicable law, enforceability 
and jurisdiction.”361 As has also been pointed out, in some cases parties 
to a proceeding may have a specific vested interest in not disclosing all 
the facts pertinent to the issues in dispute.362 Commenting on the AES v. 
Hungary case, scholars have argued that it is possible that “neither 
Hungary nor the investor would have an interest in emphasizing the fact 
that the contracts between them may violate the EC’s restrictions on 
State aid.”363 As a result, the EC’s “involvement [can] potentially 
highlight relevant legal issues that may not otherwise have 
prominence.”364 Amicus curiae may also have a role to play in unearthing 
cases of bribery or corruption.365
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Moreover, it has been argued that participation by representatives of 
supranational regimes, such as the EC, can assist in preventing the 
fragmentation of international law.366 “A lack of coordination at the 
international level may lead to national authorities increasingly becoming 
subject to conflicting commands from different supranational 
systems.”367 The EC can contribute to prevent fragmentation of European 
Union Law and enforcement in the European territory of awards contrary 
to European Union public policy.368
The participation of third parties in investor-state arbitration 
proceedings is justified by many reasons.369 What is more, “decision-
makers should consider introducing potentially broader participation 
rights than merely making written submissions, on the basis that amicus 
contributions could create substantial benefits for the arbitral proceedings 
and for the investment arbitration regime in the wider context of 
international law.”370
D. Impact on the Proceedings 
Time and cost-effectiveness are major concerns in any dispute 
resolution process. One of the advantages of arbitration is that it is, as a 
rule, faster and cheaper than court proceedings.371 Parties to investment 
disputes attach great importance to these factors as most proceedings run 
several years and entail large costs.372 With the introduction of 
mechanisms for third-party participation, investment tribunals must take 
into account the additional costs generated by the proceedings, including 
extra time (and thus, money) spent by the tribunal and the parties.373
Amicus participation disrupts the ordinary timeline of arbitration and 
can severely slow down the proceedings. It requires both the parties and 
the tribunal to expend time reviewing, evaluating, and if necessary 
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 367. Id.
 368. Id.
 369. Id. at 219. 
 370. Levine, supra note 92, at 219. 
 371. JULIAN LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 8–9 (2003). 
 372. Tienhaara, supra note 279, at 240. 
 373. Brower, supra note 276, at 28–29. 
2017] A Guardian and a Friend? 295
responding to amicus submissions.374 First, arbitrators have to determine 
whether a brief will be accepted at all, then review the submissions once 
made, and finally analyze whether the contents of the submission are 
relevant for their decision.375 Parties may have to comment on 
applications for amicus curiae status and, if the tribunal accepts them, 
respond to amicus curiae briefs.376 This all creates an additional burden 
on parties, who need to put in the extra effort of addressing facts or legal 
arguments presented by the amicus,377 which may disorganize their 
strategy.378 This burden can be quite significant for the party opposing 
the amicus submission.379 “In order not to jeopardize due process the 
disputing parties ought to be awarded sufficient time to react to such 
written submissions, which of course takes time and hence prolongs the 
process.”380 These delays are multiplied if a third party is given the 
opportunity to reply to critiques of its opinion raised by the parties.381 On 
the other hand, it also needs to be taken into account that the arbitral 
tribunal is receiving information that can be of high relevance for the 
resolution of the dispute “at no direct cost to either party, (as amici, 
unlike experts, are not remunerated for their services.)”382 As a result, the 
potential benefits of third party participation may well outweigh the 
additional expenses that it entails. 
The intervention of amici curiae, however useful, should not 
overburden the process.383 Arbitral tribunals have affirmed this point 
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repeatedly.384 Several tools have been developed in arbitral practice in 
order to reduce the negative impact of amicus curiae participation in the 
proceedings. The expectable increase in cost and length of the 
proceedings can be minimized by clear procedures for when and how 
amici may participate.385 For example, arbitral tribunals typically limit 
amicus curiae briefs to a fixed number of pages. This tool limits the 
amount of material that disputing parties have to respond to and that 
tribunals have to assess. In cases where the EC intervened as amicus 
curiae, arbitral tribunals have limited written submissions to limits 
ranging from 25 to 50 pages.386 However, it is debatable whether it is 
possible for the EC to develop its arguments on highly technical legal 
issues within such limits.387 Again, the expansion of the scope of 
participation rights of amici comes into play. Tribunals are required to 
balance the interests of time and cost efficient dispute settlement with the 
direct legal interest of the EC in the proceedings, and the wordiness that 
is normally associated with intricate legal debates. 
Naturally, the extended length of proceedings resulting from third-
party participation can also make arbitration more expensive,388 as this is 
a new expense that will have to be borne by the parties.389 From the 
perspective of respondents, raising costs may work against the public 
interest390 especially when they are developing states. Increased costs and 
delays risk turning arbitration into something too similar to judicial 
proceedings and therefore look less attractive for disputing parties.391
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Furthermore, if costs are unevenly distributed, this may affect party 
equality.392
In the decision on costs in Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, the tribunal 
acknowledged that the investors had to expend much time and cost to 
deal with the EC’s submissions. In the words of the tribunal,  
far from exercising the traditional role of an “amicus curiae,” the 
Commission became a second respondent more hostile to Electrabel 
than Hungary itself. If accepted by the Tribunal, the Commission’s 
submissions would have been fatal to Electrabel’s case. The Tribunal 
was required to decide these issues at length in its Decision and there 
reject a material part of the Commission’s submissions. Overall, the 
Commission’s participation in this arbitration was a hugely 
complicating factor . . . For all these, Electrabel bore by far the greatest 
burden.393
The tribunal in Micula v. Romania specified that the EC should “bear 
its own costs incurred in connection with its participation in the 
proceeding, including any costs relating to any appearance by the [EC]’s 
representative(s) . . . at the hearing.”394 On the annulment proceedings 
that ensued, on its decision on costs, the committee held that “the present 
case involved a ‘difficult and novel question of public importance’ due to 
the intervention of the EC representing the EU’s interests.”395
In European American Investment Bank v. Slovak Republic the 
tribunal discussed in some depth how costs arising from the participation 
of Austria, the Czech Republic, and the EC in the proceedings should be 
borne by the disputing parties.396 In the tribunal’s opinion, there was “no 
reason to hold the Claimant responsible for the increased procedural 
costs arising from” that intervention.397
While such invitation was prompted by a request from the Claimant, 
the Tribunal invited these submissions on the basis that they would 
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usefully contribute to the tribunal’s own analysis . . . Moreover, the 
Claimant had only requested that Austria be invited to make an amicus 
curiae submission. It was the Respondent’s [] request that the [EC] and 
the Czech Republic also be invited to make amicus curiae
submissions.398
A question that is not addressed in investment treaties or arbitral rules 
regards the contribution of amicus curiae to the costs of arbitration. In 
the current system, investors and host states bear the costs derived from 
the time that arbitrators and lawyers devote to analyze or respond to the 
amicus briefs.399 This invites the question of whether it would be useful 
to create a system where interveners would contribute to the arbitration 
costs in exchange for the benefit they receive from amicus 
participation.400 Some propose that amici curiae be asked to “pay in 
advance a lump sum to cover the attorneys’ fees of the party opposing 
the submission, as a form of security for costs. The security would then 
be allocated at the time of the final award, and potentially returned to the 
amicus.”401 While this proposal may be contentious, it is certainly 
understandable.402 The disadvantage of this system is that it would pass 
the costs to the amicus, making the presentation of valuable contributions 
cost prohibitive. Authors have suggested the creation of a fund to cover 
the expenses of amicus curiae intervention, but the international 
agreement needed for such a fund may prove politically difficult to 
secure.403
E. Impact on the Decision 
Arguments submitted by amicus curiae may influence the outcome of 
the dispute.404 At least that is what amici hope. However, the actual 
impact of amicus curiae briefs on the outcome of the proceedings is 
difficult to assess. Past practice shows that even when amicus curiae 
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briefs are accepted, tribunals seldom refer to them.405 Their impact in the 
final award is, in many cases, negligible.406 Naturally, “the degree of 
credibility and relevance granted by the court to the amicus brief . . . 
depend[s] on its quality.”407 Whether amicus curiae participation will 
fulfill its potential depends on how each arbitral tribunal uses amicus 
submissions.408
Nevertheless, arbitral tribunals frequently thank the EC for its 
participation and underline how useful it was for the good decision of the 
dispute. In Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary the tribunal stated that it wished to 
“record its thanks and appreciation to the European Commission for its 
Submission, as regard both applicable law and jurisdiction. It is a 
lengthy, scholarly and important document for these arbitration 
proceedings.”409 The tribunal added that it had, with the assistance of the 
parties and their expert witnesses, “considered at length the terms and 
effect of the European Commission’s Submission in these arbitration 
proceedings.”410 It further stated:
Albeit with hindsight, it is unfortunate that the European Commission 
could not play a more active role as a non-disputing party in this 
arbitration, given that . . . the European Union is a Contracting Party to 
the ECT in which it played from the outset a leading role; and, 
moreover, that the European Commission’s perspective on this case is 
not the same as the Respondent’s and still less that of the Claimant. In 
short, the European Commission has much more than “a significant 
interest” in these arbitration proceedings.411
The tribunal in AES v. Hungary also acknowledged the “efforts made 
by the European Commission to explain its own position to the 
Tribunal,” stating that it had “duly considered the points developed in its 
amicus curiae brief” in its decisions.412 In Achmea v. Slovak Republic the 
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tribunal stated that it has “considered carefully the submissions made by 
the Parties, as well as the observations of the Government of the 
Netherlands and of the European Commission, all of which were helpful 
and for all of which the Tribunal thanks their respective authors.”413 In
Charanne v. Spain the tribunal started by clarifying that it has  
given the most careful consideration to the Amicus EC, which it has 
found very useful. The Tribunal wishes to thank the European 
Commission for it. However, the Tribunal recalls that the European 
Commission is not party to these proceedings and, therefore, in this 
award the Tribunal will only respond to the arguments of the Parties, in 
light, of course, of the elements of reflection provided by the EC.414
The arguments presented by the EC are frequently cited and discussed 
in the decisions of tribunals. In Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary the tribunal 
devoted several pages to commenting on the arguments made by the 
EC.415 In Micula v. Romania the tribunal addressed the comments made 
by the EC in its capacity as amicus curiae.416 In the annulment 
proceedings that followed, the EC’s arguments, claiming that the award 
had to be annulled, are also discussed at length.417 In Achmea v. Slovak 
Republic the tribunal stated that all of the points made in the EC’s 
submission have been taken into account, even though it did not consider 
necessary to address and decide in turn each and every one of them.418
The tribunal in European American Investment Bank v. Slovak Republic
stated that it had
considered carefully the submissions made by the Parties, as well as the 
observations of the Government of Austria, the Government of the 
Czech Republic and the European Commission, all of which were 
helpful and for which the Tribunal thanks their respective authors. All 
of the points made in those submissions have been fully taken into 
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account by the Tribunal even if the Tribunal does not repeat them in its 
reasoning.419
The intervention of the EC may influence the final outcome of the 
arbitration. While substantive arguments submitted in the amicus 
petitions of NGOs have seldom been into account by arbitral tribunals, 
Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary and AES v. Hungary seem to suggest a 
different trend.420 In the latter case the arguments of the EC were 
substantively taken into account.421 Considering that the European Union is a 
member of the Energy Charter Treaty, Hoffmeister argues that the 
activity of the EC in AES v. Hungary certainly influenced the final 
outcome of the award, where the arbitrators did not find any violation by 
Hungary of Energy Charter Treaty standards, having in mind that a 
contrary award might have conflicted with European Union law.422
These cases demonstrate that the identity of third parties making 
amicus curiae submissions may affect how the tribunal perceives them.423
The EC has been building up its investment expertise through the 
submission of amicus curiae briefs to arbitration tribunals. Its major 
contribution to the proceedings relates to its expertise in European Union 
and International Law, and not to diverse and generic interests 
represented by NGOs or civil society groups. Acceptance of the EC as 
amicus curiae has shown that independence of such a regional 
organization from its individual members did not raise serious concerns 
with the tribunal. “On the contrary, expertise and experience in the 
manifold activities undertaken by such organizations make them . . . 
perhaps more desirable than NGOs as amicus curiae.”424
IV. FINAL REMARKS
Over the last 15 years the submission of amicus curiae briefs became 
a regular feature of international investment arbitral proceedings. 
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Investment tribunals play a significant role in shaping the understanding 
and evolution of international investment law. They provide fora where 
important socio-legal, political, and commercial matters are resolved. 
The intervention of non-disputing parties in the proceedings is not 
limited to public interest advocacy groups, as various types of legal 
entities may be admitted as amicus curiae. International investment 
disputes are increasingly attracting the attention of the European Union. 
The EC has discovered this procedural tool, enabling its participation in 
investment arbitrations that have been instituted against European Union 
members. The European Union, through the EC, may contribute to the 
quality of arbitral awards by offering its legal expertise in European 
Union Law matters, possibly even contributing to mitigate the 
fragmentation of international law, thus improving the legitimacy and 
efficiency of the overall legal framework. 
Naturally, the intervention of an amicus with political, legislative, and 
executive functions, also presents challenges for arbitral tribunals. This 
paper argues that the EC plays a role that is quite different from that of 
NGOs and civil society groups. The distinctive nature of this amicus 
explains may justify the extension of its participatory rights. As more 
awards become public, it will be possible not only to examine how 
arbitral tribunals are approaching these problems, but also to determine 
with higher clarity the real influence that the participation of the EC is 
playing the investment proceedings. 
Under Article 207(1) of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has 
competence to conclude international investment treaties.425 The EC 
cannot not be made a party in arbitration proceedings involving 
European Union members because of the privity to the arbitration 
agreement.426 “This is all the more true for ICSID arbitrations, to which 
most member state BITs dispute resolution clauses refer, since the 
European Union, as a supranational organisation, can at present not 
become a party to the ICSID Convention since its signature is only open 
to ‘states.’”427 It remains an open question, however, how the ICSID 
Convention itself could be changed to accommodate such parties, given 
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that it currently does not foresee accession by an international economic 
integration organization.428
In the future, under the forthcoming European investment regime, the 
EU will be able to take part in investor-state proceedings as a party. Until 
the European Union concludes its own investment agreements, the 
amicus curiae mechanism will continue to be the only effective tool for 
the EC to intervene in investor-state arbitration proceedings that touch 
upon matters that are considered to fall within the remit of the EC as the 
“guardian of European Union Law.” The case law discussed in this paper 
allows analysis of the main features of a phenomenon which is only at its 
inception stage and which will probably evolve and mature in the near 
future. The diversification in the nature of amici and in the interests they 
pursue is also a token of the dynamic, ever-changing nature of modern 
investment law and arbitration. 
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